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ARTICLES
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE 
TRANSPARENCY DEFICIT 
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.* AND LANDYN WM. ROOKARD**
Modern government is comprised of a complex admixture of public and private actors.  
From the provision of public services, to growing movements to sell off national parks, to the 
very task of legislating, the public is unlikely to encounter an area of government that is 
untouched by privatization.  But public transparency mechanisms, including the seminal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rely upon an outdated, rigid conception of the private-
public dichotomy.  They fail to provide the public with any meaningful access to what we 
call the “private government,” which includes the private actors who bear an increasing 
responsibility for performing governmental functions.  A paradigm shift is required, from a 
focus on who creates or possesses a document, to the public impact and importance of the 
document.
We propose to turn the primary tool of privatization—the private law contract—into a 
mechanism for injecting public oversight into contractual delegation.  Specifically, we outline 
a framework for a statute which would require agencies to retain ownership of information 
created pursuant to a contractual relationship or to justify, ex ante, why the public interest 
in public access is outweighed by other considerations.  The agency-owned records would be 
subject to the full panoply of ordinary FOIA provisions and any decision to exempt records 
*   Roscoe C. O’Byrne Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.  We 
would like to thank Professor Carol Greenhouse, Alfred C. Marks Professor Emeritus, Prince-
ton University, for her enormously helpful comments and suggestions on this piece throughout 
its creation and production.  We also wish to thank Dr. June Sekera, Research Fellow for 
Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University and Honorary Senior Re-
search Associate, Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, University College London for 
her role in encouraging the initial development of this paper and her comments and sugges-
tions throughout its development. 
**   Associate, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP.  Former Law Clerk to the Hon. Jane E. 
Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge, and the Hon. Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge, both of the 
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from the ownership requirement would be subject to judicial review.  Our proposal mitigates 
some of the problems inherent in asking private entities to open their books to FOIA scrutiny 
and properly places the onus on public agencies to fulfill their roles as protectors of the public. 
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a dramatic expansion of private actors carrying out gov-
ernmental functions, largely by taking advantage of deregulation, outsourc-
ing, and marketized approaches to the regulation that remains.1  Business 
1. While we focus herein on mechanisms of privatization in the United States, these are 
truly global issues, and the solutions we present may be adapted and scaled to address these 
issues around the world. See, e.g., Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public 
Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1612 (2001) (“[G]overnments from the 
United States and Canada to Malaysia and New Zealand are being challenged to reinvent, 
downsize, privatize, devolve, decentralize, deregulate and de-layer themselves, subject them-
selves to performance tests, and contract themselves out.”); John B. Goodman & Gary W. 
Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.–Dec. 1991), 
https://hbr.org/1991/11/does-privatization-serve-the-public-interest (“By the end of the 
1980s, sales of state enterprises worldwide had reached a total of over $185 billion . . . .  In 
1990 alone, the world’s governments sold off $25 billion in state-owned enterprises—with 
continents vying to see who could claim the privatization title.”); see ROBERT KUTTNER, CAN
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norms and market values have become central even to noneconomic institu-
tions such as public safety providers, welfare, prisons, and safety net regula-
tion generally.2  Many administrative agencies now regularly contract with 
private parties, specifying terms at the outset, and maintaining a varying de-
gree of supervisory authority.  As a practical matter, however, it is the private 
contractors who now deliver not only many of the services formerly reserved 
to government, but exercise roles once traditionally considered to be “core 
governmental functions,” such as the management of prisons.3  In sum, since 
the 1970s, economic thinking has pervaded—indeed dominated—public ad-
ministration and the politics of law.4
The artificial bright line historically drawn between public and private—
through deeply entrenched doctrines such as the “state action” doctrine5—
frequently takes private actions out of the constitutional due process orbit 
and beyond the reach of important “quasi-constitutional” civil rights statutes, 
such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).6  The rigidity of the private-
of postcommunist triumphalism, many were predicting that globalization would link democ-
racy with capitalism in a splendid convergence.  Instead, we are witnessing a primitive back-
lash against both the global market and liberal democracy.”).
2. For examples of many of the administrative law issues currently involved in such areas, 
particularly those involved with outsourcing, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Carol J. Greenhouse, 
Prison Privatization and Inmate Labor in the Global Economy: Reframing the Debate Over Private Prisons,
42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 355 (2014); also see Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The
Human Side of Public-Private Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation to Administrative Law Management,
102 IOWA L. REV. 883 (2017). Cf. Mariana Valverde, Fleur Johns & Jennifer Raso, Governing
Infrastructure in the Age of the “Art of the Deal”: Logics of Governance and Scales of Visibility, POL. &
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV., Sept. 2018, at 118 (“For a long time, bridges, tunnels, public 
hospitals, commuter train lines, and similar projects were called public works—not only be-
cause they serve public purposes but also because they were planned and largely funded by 
government agencies.”). 
3. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Transnationalization of Domestic Law: A Perspective from the United 
States, IND. UNIV. MAURER SCH. LAW, Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 401, 1, 2 (2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3260875.
4. Id. at 10–11. 
5. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Information, Privacy, and Technology: Citizens, Clients, or Consumers?, in
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR
DAVID WILLIAMS 325, 336 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000) (“The public function 
approach can be seen as an extension of the United States Supreme Court’s state action con-
cept, where entities performing functions for the government are deemed state actors for con-
stitutional purposes.  Arguably, if these entities can be termed ‘state actors’ under the Consti-
tution, they should be subject to access as governmental agencies under the [Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA)].”). 
6. Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elu-
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public divide fails to appreciate that the modern state exercises its authority 
in complex ways.7  It further fails to recognize that privatization is very much 
a form of governmental action.  The defining characteristic of modern pri-
vatization has been not just the mere contracting for the provision of services, 
but the delegation (often without fanfare or public input) of public author-
ity to private entities.8  “[T]he notion [that] the public relates to ‘state 
based authority,’ and the ‘private’ to other actors” no longer accurately 
describes the current governing regimes.9  The “government” with which 
the average citizen interacts is a complex admixture of private and public 
actors, empowered by an intricate web of statutes, regulations, contracts, 
and less formal partnerships.  As a consequence, private actors provide ser-
vices, make decisions, and even craft terms of legislation and regulation.10
foundations” and a “quasi-constitutional character”); see also Courthouse News Serv. v. 
Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2018) (Hamilton, J.) (internal brackets and quotations 
omitted) (“A major purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs.  Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen . . . .”). 
7. See Janet McLean, Lecture, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 
IND. L.J. 363, 363 (2004) (“Corporations and states are commonly represented as having an 
oppositional relationship.  Corporations represent the private; states represent the pub-
lic . . . But these commonly held views are ahistorical and tend to ignore the complex relation-
ships between states and corporations.”). 
8. See, e.g., Valverde et al., supra note 2, at 120 (“[O]fficial discourse [on public-private 
partnerships] avoids language that might describe an increase in private sector power in fa-
vor of gestures toward ‘innovation’ and misleading terms, such as transferring risks to the private 
sector—which, in turn, is presented as inherently innovative and therefore ‘good.’”); Horatia 
Muir Watt, Private International Law’s Shadow Contribution to the Question of Informal Transnational 
Authority, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 39 (2018) (“[P]ublic international law is 
now . . . increasingly confronted with conflicts articulated as collisions of jurisdictions and 
applicable law.  Among these, private or hybrid authorities and regimes now occupy a sig-
nificant place.”). 
9. Timo Walter & Oliver Kessler, The Public and Its Problems: How the EU’s Capital Market 
Union Defines the Bounds of Legitimate Knowledge and Redraws the Boundaries of (Public) Authority, 25 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 157, 158 (2018). 
10. Privately-created standards began as ways to coordinate “limited and eminently tech-
nical” issues, such as measurement methodologies and equipment standards, to ensure com-
patibility across countries and industries.  Naoli Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The 
International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 490 (1995).  But such standards have grown increasingly ambitious and 
multifaceted, and as they have expanded in scope, have become frequently “incorporated by 
reference by national or international regulators, giving what began as voluntary standards 
the force of law.”  ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, TRANSNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND PROBLEMS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD 401 (2017).  “Free public access to 
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This, in turn, impacts jobs, public safety, transportation, access to justice, 
healthcare, welfare, and much more.11
FOIA, especially as originally conceived and drafted, is ill-suited to pro-
vide access to privately-created or privately-held information—regardless of 
the public nature, importance, or funding of the information.12  FOIA’s struc-
ture, at present, reflects the unyielding and imprecise private-public dichot-
omy.13  Nonetheless, as we shall argue, FOIA represents a transparency ethic 
the Federal Register’s reading room . . . Otherwise a reader may be required to pay substan-
tial access fees set by drafting organizations, significantly obstructing public access, particu-
larly by individuals and small businesses.”  ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY
PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 106A, at 17 (2016).  Equi-
table participation in such quasi-legislative processes is all but nonexistent; rather, only those 
with the resources or cache to be invited have a say.  These practices have drawn a growing 
body of critical literature, including, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The
Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF 
GLOBAL REGULATION 44 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009); Peter L. Strauss, Private
Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013); Paul R. Verkuil, 
Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 433–36 (2006) 
(“Both state legislatures and Congress delegate authority to [Standard Setting Organizations] 
to formulate standards . . . [which are] then incorporated directly into law.”); David A. Wirth, 
Symposium, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords 
and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 79 (2009). 
11. We use the term private government throughout this article to emphasize the gov-
ernmental roles fulfilled by private entities in the context of outsourcing.  Scholars often dif-
ferentiate the public actions with which we are concerned from those carried out by the private 
sector, often described as a form of “governance” or an example of “governmentality.”  The 
usage of “governance” implies that the activities being carried out by the private entity in-
volved represents an alternative to government, as “if equal to its effects [but] by different 
means.”  A binary distinction between government and governance is inadequate for our pur-
poses since we are concerned with the source of governing authority, not just its endpoint in 
implementation.  In the expanded FOIA context that is the subject of this Article, we are 
concerned with firms that ultimately rely on authority derived from the state.  In most of our 
examples, that authority derives from a contract initiated by the state with a private entity.  
When governance (in the usual sense of this term) involves a transfer of state authority to non-
state actors, “states govern through civil society entities, not merely in tandem with or in the 
context of society.”  AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 14–15 (drawing on Ole Jacob 
Sending & Iver B. Neumann, Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States and Power, 50 
INT’L STUD. Q. 651 (2006) (arguing against the “conventional binarisms of government and 
governance, state and society, and ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’”)).
12. See generally Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of 
Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999). 
13. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 402–21 (articulating a historical de-
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which warrants preserving and advancing so as to shed light on the modern 
private state.  Moreover, when adjusted to properly focus on the nature of 
the document instead of its producer or holder, FOIA provides some promise 
as an adaptable model for private contractors. 
Alternative forms of privatization without contracts, such as public asset 
sales, education vouchers, deregulation, marketization, and various hybrids, 
are gaining momentum among privatization advocates.14  Because of this 
shift, activities that may at one point have been considered as purely “pri-
vate” take on public character due to their vast public impact, such as indus-
trial activities that are harmful to the environment or untoward labor prac-
tices that undermine the legitimate economy.  Increasingly, governments 
have made the deliberate decision to scale back regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms and to instead defer to market forces, i.e., private companies 
and other private actors, to set these norms.  These forms of privatization 
pose even more problems to a comprehensive transparency regime,15 and 
further demonstrate the embeddedness of private government throughout 
structures of public authority. 
Can citizens more effectively be involved in governing such processes?16
We think they can, though at this point such involvement appears increas-
ingly aspirational.17  The transparency deficit we identify deepens the well-
documented “democracy deficit” by undermining the accountability of pub-
lic officials and the transparency of public actions—the core values and 
structures of democratic society.18  Protecting important rights for prisoners 
and those in need of healthcare or welfare assistance, not to mention citizens 
extent, “[t]he public-private distinction still has a role to play in locating limits on the trans-
fer of political power to private hands”). 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. E.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 515 
(2017) (addressing problems in cybersecurity, including the prevalence of informal arrange-
ments between law enforcement and private persons/entities); Chris Edwards, Privatization,
DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T (Jul. 12, 2016), https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/pri 
vatization (collecting examples of privatization, many of which would not require contracts).
16. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT 1 (2004). 
17. Id.
18. Id.; Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 949 (2006) (“But 
transparency is also necessary because a state that fails to design a system capable of disclosing 
information essential for a government to be held accountable by an informed public is un-
democratic.”); Andrea Ballestero S., Transparency in Triads, 35 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY
REV. 160, 160 (2012) (“[T]ransparency technologies are intended to correct the democratic 
deficits of existing forms of law, bureaucracy, and even subjectivity.  Here, transparency is as a 







      09/18/2019   13:09:53
adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 10 Side A      09/18/2019   13:09:53
C M
Y K
ALR 71.3_AMAN & ROOKARD_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)_ME FORMATTING 8/28/19 6:32 PM
2019] PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE TRANSPARENCY DEFICIT 443 
who might have benefitted more from direct regulation as opposed to mar-
ketized approaches, has proven difficult, especially once public services and 
regulatory responsibilities have been shifted and entrusted to private pro-
viders.19  Indeed, issues of widespread public importance, such as public 
safety, transportation, and environmental preservation, face growing 
threats where public regulators have either been withdrawn due to dereg-
ulation or left underfunded.20  Private entities, even when wielding public 
authority, operate in nearly complete secrecy.21  Even the extent of private 
government is largely unknown by the public.22  Holding the private gov-
ernment accountable, as well as the public officials who empower it, re-
quires that its decisions be known and subject to political and, where ap-
propriate, judicial review. 
Modern government treats individuals “not just as citizens, but clients 
and consumers as well.”23  The complex variety of interactions mandates 
complex responses;24 a one-size-fits-all approach is insufficient to address 
transparency problems posed by the different forms of privatization.  Ac-
cordingly, we draw from several approaches to identify solutions for con-
fronting new or unfamiliar regimes of private government.  When practica-
ble, we propose to turn the primary tool of privatization—the private law 
contract—into a mechanism for injecting public oversight into private gov-
ernment.  Where privatization occurs without a contract, we rely upon the 
broader social contract to justify and propose methods for mandating af-
firmative disclosure of information that has significant public impact.  These 
include proposals to include transparency clauses in asset sales contracts and 
to expand affirmative disclosure regimes, ranging from financial disclosures 
to product labelling. 
The character of public power is not fundamentally altered by placing it 
into private hands.  To the contrary, its public character persists, as should 
be attendant on a broader conception of public law generally and adminis-
19. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Privatized Government Functions and 
Freedom of Information: Public Accountability in an Age of Private Governance, 75 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 464, 470–71 (1998).
20. See discussion and sources cited infra Part III. 
21. Cf. Feiser, supra note 12, at 23 (“As the federal government contracts with private 
entities to handle these services, citizens are finding it very difficult to obtain important infor-
mation related to the government . . . .”). 
22. Id.
23. Aman, supra note 5, at 333. 
24. See Goodman & Loveman, supra note 1 (“Privatization . . . is not one clear and abso-
lute economic proposition.  Rather it covers a wide range of different activities, all of which 
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trative law in particular.  The primary method of protecting that public char-
acter—the democratic process and judicial enforcement mechanisms that 
are unique to public entities25—is insulated (if not completely erased) by pri-
vatization.26  Part I explains FOIA’s shortcomings, particularly as applied to 
nominally-private activity.  Part II discusses how FOIA may be enhanced to 
shed light on private government.  Part III looks beyond traditional contrac-
tual delegation to explore how other transparency-enhancing mechanisms 
may be adapted to phenomena such as asset sales and noncontractual dele-
gations of state authority.  Part IV identifies several lessons we can learn from 
the case studies, beginning with thoughts on the broader democratic impli-
cations of the burgeoning private government.  Privatization, in all of its 
forms, can obscure quintessentially public decisions and endanger demo-
cratic processes.  Decisionmakers can too easily avoid political responsibility 
for their actions by treating them as if they are the product of the market and 
not themselves.  Our proposals highlight this problem and suggest a hopeful 
path for democratizing private government. 
I. FOIA AND “PRIVATE” GOVERNMENT
Considering the reticence with which FOIA was passed and signed, it is 
no surprise that FOIA’s limitations have undermined its usefulness for ensur-
ing government transparency.  Its limitations make FOIA, in its current state, 
all but unavailable for people seeking information from private contractors 
performing important governmental tasks. 
Part I discusses this background before considering several attempts to ex-
tend, replace, and refine FOIA in Part II.  Despite its limitations, FOIA rep-
resents a model—and a transparency ethic—that is worth preserving.  That 
is, for all of the warranted criticism FOIA has received, FOIA remains re-
flective of a broader “right to know.”27  And despite its shortcomings, its pas-
sage was part of a concerted effort to address “a surfeit of secrecy and an 
information drought.”28  These remain critical threats to representative de-
mocracy.  The same forces that led to FOIA may again animate a solution 
appropriate for addressing the opacities and realities of the twenty-first cen-
tury private-public hybrid government. 
25. This includes both causes of action designed specifically to be brought against public 
entities, such as those brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act or 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and lawsuits brought by agencies and other public entities. 
26. See, e.g., Feiser, supra note 12, at 25 (“[S]imply by filtering records out of their posses-
sion, federal agencies can circumvent the [FOIA] and its spirit of open government.”). 
27. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 20. 
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A.  “I May Be Making a Mistake” 
FOIA’s principal aim is to protect the “citizens’ right to be informed about 
‘what their government is up to.’”29  Concerns for government transparency 
hearken back to the Framers.  As James Madison noted, “A popular Gov-
ernment, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must 
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”30
Nevertheless, when President Lyndon Johnson initially considered the 
legislation, some 140 years after Madison, he was personally opposed to it.  
He ultimately signed the bill into law, stating publicly: “[W]ith a deep 
sense of pride that the United States is an open society in which the peo-
ple’s right to know is cherished and guarded.”31  But privately, he had 
reservations.  One account of the signing claims that Johnson remarked: 
“I may be making a mistake.”32  But President Johnson had little to fear 
from the new bill.
FOIA was, as one commentator noted, a “weak and complicated law, 
weakened further by the Justice Department’s emasculation of the House re-
port . . . [and] further weakened by the [Justice Department’s] memoran-
dum explaining the statute and weakened even further by agency regulations 
implementing it.”33
Even as applied just to the government, FOIA faced criticism from agen-
cies (on one side of the debate) and open access advocates (on the other) from 
29. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73 
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). See generally Fred 
H. Cate, D. Annette Fields & James K. McBain, The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: 
The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41 (1994) (discussing the 
history of FOIA and arguing for the expansion of the central purpose test in applying the statute). 
30. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, no. 9, at 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910). 
31. SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 93RD CONGRESS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE
MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 1, 1 (Comm. Print 1974). 
32. Mark P. Schlefer, I Helped Draft the Freedom of Information Act 50 Years Ago.  Here’s What 
I Learned About Government Secrecy, WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/the-freedom-of-information-acts-accidental-beginnings/2016/07/01/ce
18e820-3d5e-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_story.html (“To his everlasting credit, Johnson 
signed the bill over the objection of his Cabinet.  The fact that he picked the Fourth of July 
for signing it suggests that, despite his comment, he did not think he was making a mistake.”). 
33. See Samuel J. Archibald, The Freedom of Information Act Revisited, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV.






      09/18/2019   13:09:53
adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 11 Side B      09/18/2019   13:09:53
C M
Y K
ALR 71.3_AMAN & ROOKARD_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)_ME FORMATTING 8/28/19 6:32 PM
446 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [71:3 
day one34 and continuous academic critique ever since.35  Still, it has accom-
plished undeniable good and it sets forth a transparency ethic for us that is 
worth pursuing—looking at its limitations shows that the transition from 
public to private can extend beyond services to public authority itself.36  To 
this extent, however, it is important that we revisit its weaknesses, but in to-
day’s context of an increasingly private government.
B. FOIA’s Limitations 
FOIA codifies a rigid conception of the private-public dichotomy.  Private 
providers almost always fall outside of the scope of FOIA, even when they 
provide public services pursuant to contracts with public agencies.37  While 
Congress wanted FOIA to reach entities that “perform governmental func-
tions and control information of interest to the public,”38 the statute, by its 
terms, reaches only “agency”39 and “agency record[s].”40  And while 
34. E.g., Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REV. 1, 15 (1970). 
35. E.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1014–15 (2008) (collecting authorities); Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for 
FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455 (2015). 
36. With FOIA, the United States became only the third country in the world to pass a 
comprehensive public access regime.  In 2018, over fifty years on from FOIA’s passage, FOIA 
ranked just 69th nationally on the Global Right to Information Rating, a leading index that 
measures the strength of a country’s public access framework.  CTR. FOR LAW & DEMOCRACY
& ACCESS INFO. EUR., By Country, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION RATING,
https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  This may be at-
tributed in no small part to the increasing frequency with which private organizations perform 
public functions and the effectiveness of the exemptions in the present legislation.  CTR. FOR 
LAW & DEMOCRACY & ACCESS INFO. EUR., United States, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION
RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-detail/?country=United%20States (last visited 
July 25, 2019) (assessing zero points because “FOIA does not apply to any private corpora-
tions,” including “private bodies that perform a public function and . . . private bodies that 
receive significant public funding”). 
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 93–876, at 8 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6274; see
5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (“‘[A]gency’ . . . includes any executive department, military department, 
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the 
executive branch . . . , or any independent regulatory agency . . . .”). 
39. “Agency” is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012). 
40. This brief summary draws from Feiser, supra note 12, at 23; JUNE SEKERA & DANIEL
AGOSTINO, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV’T INST. AT TUFTS UNIV., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
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“agency” is defined to include “government controlled corporation” as an 
item separate from, but alongside, “government corporation,” the courts 
quickly shut down the idea that financial control, on its own, could suffice.41
Rather, active, “substantial federal supervision” over an entity’s operations 
is required to satisfy the agency definition.42
Even if a private entity meets this tough standard and qualifies as a 
“government-controlled corporation” (and thus as an “agency”), the 
“agency record” element imposes an additional hurdle.  As interpreted by 
the courts, a record is an “agency record” only where it is both possessed 
by an agency and controlled for official use.43  Thus, even if a private com-
pany holds an agency record, or if an agency holds a privately-created 
record, if it is not held for “official use,” the record does not qualify for 
FOIA disclosure.44
Finally, even if a private company meets the “agency” definition and has 
a record that is an “agency record,” FOIA contains nine express exemptions 
that further limit disclosure.45  These include documents relevant to national 
41. Feiser, supra note 12, at 37–42. 
42. Feiser notes that one critical battleground was over the definition of “govern-
ment-controlled corporation.”  Feiser, supra note 12, at 37–42.  Feiser observed that, in 
Forsham v. Harris, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal grantees 
could be considered “agencies,” but decided that grantee status would be insufficient 
without “substantial federal supervision.” Id. at 38 (citing Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 
180 n.11 (1980)). 
43. Feiser, supra note 12 at 43–44. 
44. This test insulates private service providers from FOIA’s disclosure requirements 
without any inquiry into the function they are performing or whether the function was dele-
gated by an agency pursuant to statutory authority.  Government agencies may thus “avoid 
the Act’s requirements by transferring records out of the government’s hands” with impunity.  
Feiser, supra note 12 at 36.  But much as courts applying civil discovery rules have looked to 
pragmatic definitions of “control” to require parties to produce documents technically in the 
hands of nonparties, so too is it possible to come up with a principled solution that would 
sufficiently protect the public’s interest in critical government dealings while preventing bona 
fide business documents from routine disclosure. E.g., Williams v. Angie’s List, No. 1:16-cv-
00878-WTL-MJD, 2017 WL 1318419, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2017) (holding that com-
pany had to turn over nonparty-held background data from sale platform because the com-
pany “cannot avoid producing these data with the excuse that it has outsourced critical com-
ponents of their employees’ work tasks, all while taking full advantage of the benefits of that 
outsourcing relationship,” looking to pragmatic indicia to decide whether the company had 
“control” over the data).  Taking a cue from Williams, we believe the state may not avoid 
providing information from the public merely because it has outsourced “critical components” 
of public governance. 
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security,46 internal agency personnel documents,47 certain information ex-
empt by statute,48 trade secrets,49 certain interagency memoranda,50 and cer-
tain law enforcement documents,51 among others.  The controversial and 
overinclusive nature of these exemptions is well analyzed in the literature,52
but it suffices for present purposes to observe that these exemptions (1) fur-
ther undermine the transparency ethic embodied in FOIA and (2) may actu-
ally be useful in fine-tuning FOIA to adequately account for competing in-
terests as applied to private companies. 
As currently interpreted, whether information is subject to FOIA turns 
primarily on who creates and who possesses a particular record.  This focus 
codifies a faulty normative premise—namely, that whether the public has the 
right to access information should turn on who makes or holds a particular 
record.  It also codifies the faulty public-private dichotomy, relying upon the 
assumption that agencies are governmental or “public” and all other provid-
ers are “private.”  We argue that the public’s right to access must be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the information itself.53
46. Id. § 552(b)(1). 
47. Id. § 552(b)(2). 
48. Id. § 552(b)(3). 
49. Id. § 552(b)(4). 
50. Id. § 552(b)(5).  One particularly absurd invocation of this exemption involves the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) refusal to release emails regarding Chairman 
Ajit Pai’s “Harlem Shake” YouTube video, designed in collaboration with conservative news 
website Daily Caller to promote his efforts to repeal the FCC’s “net neutrality” rule.  Jon 
Brodkin, Ajit Pai’s “Harlem Shake” Video Preparations Must Remain Secret, FCC Says, ARS TECHNICA
(Apr. 6, 2018, 12:14 P.M.), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/04/fcc-wont-reveal-
the-secrets-behind-ajit-pais-anti-net-neutrality-dance-video/; Mikael Thalen, FCC Finally Re-
leases Emails on Ajit Pai’s ‘Harlem Shake’ Video, DAILY DOT (Dec. 17, 2018, 2:33 P.M.) 
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/fcc-emails-ajit-pai-harlem-shake/. 
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012). 
52. E.g., Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the OPEN Government Act 
of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 427, 446 (2008) (focusing 
on overbroad interpretation of certain exemptions); William R. Sherman, The Deliberation Par-
adox and Administrative Law, 2015 BYU L. REV. 413, 425 (2015); Zachary D. Reisch, Note, The
FOIA Improvement Act: Using a Requested Record’s Age to Restrict Exemption 5’s Deliberative Process Priv-
ilege, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2017); cf. Christine N. Walz & Charles D. Tobin, The FOIA 
“Exclusions” Statute: The Government’s License to Lie, COMM. LAW. J. MEDIA INFO. COMM. & L.,
Mar. 2014, at 10 (criticizing FOIA “exclusions” which permit government, under certain cir-
cumstances, to respond to requests with “we have no records,” even when records exist).  This 
trend has continued with the Supreme Court’s decision in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader 
Media, No. 18–481, slip op. at 5–12 (U.S. June 24, 2019), endorsing a broad interpretation of 
the confidential commercial information component of Exemption 4. 
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An appropriate framework should balance inquiries such as: Does the in-
formation relate to governmental functions?  Does it have a non-incidental 
impact on the public?  Was the information created pursuant to an agree-
ment with the government, or was it produced pursuant to solely private 
transactions?  Is this the type of information that agencies have produced in 
the past or would be expected to produce given their statutory mandate?  To 
put it simply, we think it uncontroversial to suggest that if a document is im-
portant enough to the public interest beyond private pecuniary concerns,54
it should not matter for purposes of a governmental transparency framework 
who creates or holds a particular record.55
Our goal is to fundamentally shift the discussion from who is creating in-
formation (e.g., an agency versus a private corporation) to what information 
is being created (e.g., records concerning toxic waste disposal versus a land 
purchase or corporate takeover).  We do not solve every problem related to 
these issues, but we believe that our proposals would effect a modest evolu-
tion in terms of private record disclosure. 
Private companies already provide many essential services affecting mar-
ginalized people—such as, for example, those in prisons or on some form of 
welfare.56  And they are increasingly providing essential services affecting all 
echelons of society, such as air traffic controllers,57 public safety providers, 
primary and secondary education, infrastructure, and other tasks formerly 
thought of as primarily public.  All strata of a society now have a vested in-
terest in ameliorating and mitigating the growing problem of “private gov-
ernment” transparency.58
54. Cf., e.g., Tai, supra note 35, at 470 (expressing concern over use of FOIA to further 
purely business ends by collecting information on competitors); Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of 
Information Act Has No Clothes, REG.: AEI J. GOV. & SOC’Y, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 16 (arguing 
that FOIA has “been used largely as a means of obtaining data in the government’s hands 
concerning private institutions”). 
55. See Aman, supra note 5, at 334–36. 
56. See generally Aman & Dugan, supra note 2. 
57. See, e.g., H.R. 2997, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. REP. NO. 115–296 (2017); Shaun 
Courtney, The Astroturf is Greener on the Other Side of the Air Traffic Debate, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 
8, 2017), https://www.aviationacrossamerica.org/news/2017/09/08/the-astroturf-is-green 
er-on-the-other-side-of-air-traffic-debate/. Transparency advocates looking for an oppor-
tunity to generate bipartisan interest may, for example, focus on the possibility of privatizing 
air traffic controllers.  That should cause concerns across the political spectrum.  If outsourcing 
of services for the indigent and marginalized fails to generate widespread concern about public 
accountability and transparency, transparency advocates could take such an opportunity to 
demonstrate how hidden governance can impact everyone. 
58. One analyst, surveying the literature, estimates that expenditures on private contrac-
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II. EXTENDING, REPLACING, AND REFINING FOIA
Over the past fifty years or so, scholars have proposed myriad solutions for 
altering FOIA to better promote the transparency ethic.  These proposals fall 
largely into two categories, ranging from ad hoc transparency bills targeting 
particular industries or subject areas to comprehensive rewrites that dispatch 
with the FOIA framework.  After analyzing solutions in each of these areas, 
we propose a third option, refining FOIA via a contractual administrative 
model that restores to agencies the power to assess, at least initially, what in-
formation produced pursuant to a contract should be made public. 
A. Extending FOIA 
Current ad hoc proposals for extending FOIA demonstrate the complex-
ities of contracting out.  The scope of public-private contracts ranges from 
nearly-complete displacement—and replacement—of public authority to 
merely recruiting private assistance with clerical or maintenance matters.  
That is not to say that the latter is risk-free when it comes to threats like graft 
or budgetary improprieties.  But a contract for maintaining a city pool carries 
with it a de minimis risk of undermining fundamental due process protections 
compared to, for example, a contract to operate and provide health services 
for a private prison.  Likewise, minimal public authority is divested when the 
government retains supervision over a construction contract.  The converse 
is true when the government passes off responsibility for designing and ad-
ministering social safety net programs or stands aside while private firefight-
ers take charge of firefighting and management.59
Ad hoc solutions proposed by scholars and politicians help identify the 
most extreme boundaries of contracting out, where what is being contracted 
is more than a service—it is power, discretion, and authority.  These contrib-
utors subscribe, as we do, to the notion that transparency is essential to inject 
2012.  JUNE SEKERA, Outsourced Government—The Quiet Revolution, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV’T INST.
TUFTS UNIV. 1, 5 (2017), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Sekera_ContractorData 
Brief_2017.pdf.  Sekera notes that private contractors outnumber federal employees two-to-
one. Id. at 2.  While that margin has fluctuated since 1984, reaching peak imbalance in 2010 
(2.28 to one), id. at 4, Sekera also observes, as we have in Aman and Dugan, supra note 2, at 
886, that the trend is “toward increased contracting out of basic governmental functions.”  
Sekera, supra, at 4. 
59. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, Kim Kardashian’s Private Firefighters Expose America’s Fault 
Lines, ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/ 
11/kim-kardashian-kanye-west-history-private-firefighting/575887/ (“[B]eginning in the 
mid-1980s and accelerating in recent years, Forest Service budget cuts and increasingly prev-
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a bit of democracy and process into these high-stakes contracts.  For example, 
scholars have identified and proposed fixes to address transparency deficits in 
environmental law,60 government contract pricing,61 international intellectual 
property law,62 military operations,63 and private prisons,64 to name just a few. 
And ad hoc proposals can make for practical case studies.  For example, 
various iterations of Senator Benjamin Cardin’s Private Prison Information 
Act have been introduced in recent years and summarized by the Congres-
sional Research Service as follows: 
This bill specifies that a record related to a non-federal prison, correctional, or 
detention facility must be considered a federal agency record for purposes of the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 
A non-federal prison, correctional, or detention facility must disclose information under 
FOIA unless the information is exempt from disclosure or the disclosure is prohibited by law. 
The term “non-federal prison, correctional, or detention facility” means: (1) a private 
prison, correctional, or detention facility; or (2) a state or local prison, jail, or other 
correctional or detention facility.65
Senator Cardin’s proposal instructs agencies to expand FOIA to private 
prisons in the following way: 
60. E.g., Sarah Lamdan, Beyond FOIA: Improving Access to Environmental Information in the 
United States, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 481, 510–11 (2017); Sarah Shik Lamdan, Sunshine for 
Sale: Environmental Contractors and the Freedom of Information Act, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 248 
(2014) [hereinafter Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale] (proposing a contract-based solution to remedy 
the transparency deficit for environmental contractors). 
61. David Allen Dulaney, Where’s the Harm?  Release Unit Prices in Awarded Contracts Under 
the Freedom of Information Act, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2010, at 37, 47. 
62. David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of International 
Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 107, 141 (2012). 
63. Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in A Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, 
and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2007); Martha Minow, 
Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and De-
mocracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1024–25 (2005); Jay A. Yagoda, Note, Seeing is Believing: The 
Detainee Abuse Photos and “Open” Government’s Enduring Resistance to their Release During an Age of 
Terror, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 303–04 (2010). But see Devin S. Schindler, Between
Safety and Transparency: Prior Restraints, FOIA, and the Power of the Executive, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 3 (2010) (arguing for limited review of the president’s decisions on whether to release 
“inflammatory but nonconfidential information” in the name of national security). 
64. E.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Correc-
tions: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 267, 270 (1995); 
Mike Tartaglia, Note, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1708 (2014). 
65. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.3422—Private Prison Information Act of 2016 Summary,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3422/text?q=%7 
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Compliance with this section by an applicable entity shall be included as a material term in 
any contract, agreement, or renewal of a contract or agreement with the applicable entity 
regarding the incarceration or detention of Federal prisoners or detainees in a non-
Federal prison, correctional, or detention facility.66
Senator Cardin’s proposal would fill an important gap in treating private 
prison providers the same as public prison providers with respect to trans-
parency while continuing to protect private companies from disclosing bona 
fide business information under the existing FOIA exemptions.67  Under 
Cardin’s proposal, private prison providers would have a clear directive, ex
ante, of what is expected and the benefit of a robust corpus of case law ex-
plaining what the FOIA responsibilities will entail.  The bill leaves no room 
for debate that private prison operators would be subject to the full panoply 
of FOIA disclosure requirements and protections. 
Senator Cardin’s proposal demonstrates a unique melding of the private 
and public.  It fundamentally requires use of private law (specifically, contract 
law) to inject a measure of public law into a contractual delegation of public 
responsibility.  Moreover, contracts speak in the familiar vernacular of mu-
tual obligations, and transparency should be considered an enforceable term 
just like any other contract term.  Perhaps this approach would be more pal-
atable to government contract seekers, which would almost certainly contest 
and resent efforts for top-down, traditional legislation or rulemaking. 
66. Private Prison Information Act of 2016, S. 3422, 114th Cong. § 3(d)(2)(A) (empha-
sis added). 
67. As we explain throughout the piece, we are committed to the idea, argued persua-
sively by politicians, policymakers, and scholars, that some tasks—and, particularly, private 
prisons—are too intimately connected with public authority and responsibility to be wholly 
delegated to the private sector. See, e.g., André Douglas Pond Cummings & Adam Lam-
parello, Private Prisons and the New Marketplace for Crime, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 407, 414 
(2016) (concluding private prisons are not economically or morally logical); Patrice A. Ful-
cher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial Complex, 51 Washburn L.J. 
589, 615 (2012) (finding that private prisons create an incentive to increase prison popula-
tions); Antonio Iglesias, Note, Abolishing the Private Prison Industry's Evolving Influence on Immigrant 
Oppression, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 293, 319 (2019) (discussing that private 
prisons encourage immigrant mistreatment); Alex Thomspon, How Sen. Elizabeth Warren Would 
Try to Ban Private Prisons, POLITICO (June 21, 2019, 4:34 P.M.), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2019/06/21/elizabeth-warren-2020-election-private-prisons-1296863 (out-
lining a plan to ban private prisons).  This Article approaches the debate from the standpoint 
of improving the public’s access to information relevant to oversight and accountability.  
There is, too, a growing literature proposing the abolition of prisons altogether as a means to 
address “the suffering wrought by overincarceration, overcriminalization, and the racialized 
violence that haunts punitive policing and imprisonment.”  Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Aboli-
tion and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1238–39 (2015) (arguing that this literature 
warrants serious consideration).  Expounding upon these arguments is beyond the scope of 
this Article except to the extent that the debate underscores the crucial role of the public in 
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Such a proposal demonstrates that while public power can easily be con-
tracted away, it can just as credibly be asserted in the same fashion.  This 
does not mean that access to privately-created documents pursuant to a gov-
ernment contract needs to be an absolute right; however, as we have sug-
gested above, the strength of the right may be conceived of as a sliding scale.  
That is, transparency mandates should reflect the extent to which a contract 
delegates public authority, such as whether the contract allows for discretion, 
whether the contractor will be interacting directly with the public, the extent 
to which the vulnerable or disenfranchised may be impacted, and so forth.  
Senator Cardin’s proposal reflects the considered judgment that these factors 
weigh in favor of transparency as applied to private prisons.68
Tackling the transparency deficit on an issue-by-issue basis yields many 
benefits, not the least of which are in-depth, robust analyses of problem areas.  
Such solutions tend to be well-reasoned, workable, and compelling—the 
product of careful consideration of the costs and benefits, both pecuniary and 
otherwise.69
Second, piecemeal solutions may more plausibly gain traction in a Con-
gress that is highly unlikely to reach a consensus on a comprehensive FOIA 
overhaul.70  Targeting particularly sensitive areas additionally permits advo-
cates to assemble a compelling body of evidence that may in turn be used to 
put pressure on elected officials.  Moreover, once a statute is implemented to 
increase transparency for a particular industry, we may use the resulting data 
as a real-world experiment to draw conclusions about what worked and what 
requires further fine-tuning.  To that end, transparency advocates may like-
wise seek state FOIA amendments in jurisdictions friendly to such efforts and 
use the resulting data to craft federal solutions. 
Third, we may look at trends in these scholars’ focuses to identify solutions 
that may work more broadly, as well as to look at areas of particular concern. 
An ad hoc approach to remedying the transparency deficit left by FOIA car-
ries with it drawbacks; however, many are simply the flip side of the benefits 
listed above.  First, and most obviously, these solutions are underinclusive 
68. Cf., e.g., Chandra Bozelko, Open Record Laws Should Apply to Private Prisons, Too, HILL
(Aug. 9, 2017, 5:00 P.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/crime/345959-open-rec 
ord-laws-should-apply-to-private-prisons-too (discussing Senator Cardin’s proposal and the 
revelations on substandard performance, conditions, and treatment that have been unearthed 
from the limited data presently available on private prisons). 
69. See, e.g., Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale, supra note 60, at 258 (accounting for costs and ben-
efits of contractual transparency requirements versus public participation models). 
70. See., e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, In Congress, Only Gloom is Bipartisan,
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and somewhat arbitrary, likely allowing many key areas of private govern-
ance to proceed unscrutinized. 
Second, and less obvious, is transparency fatigue.  Transparency is not 
cost free.  It has, moreover, many opponents in those who benefit from the 
status quo.71  A gradual approach to transparency improvements (such as 
on a subject-by-subject basis) would provide special interests, lobbyists, and 
recalcitrant politicians with opportunities to stymie further gains at every 
turn.  We advocate that the larger debate over the soul of this country, and 
the need to return the public into the private, should happen sooner rather 
than later.  Piecemeal debates may cause the political process to devolve 
into gamesmanship.72
Theoretically, as a case study in efforts to address the private government 
transparency deficit, an ad hoc FOIA extension properly focuses on what it 
is that private entity is doing, such as operating a prison or putting out wild-
fires, instead of who is doing the action.  But in picking and choosing some 
private contractors and not others, a piecemeal approach by its very nature 
fails to treat the private government as such—as an arena which presump-
tively merits attention just the same as public government because of its char-
acter as a manifestation of essentially public action.  Proposals such as Sena-
tor Cardin’s are accompanied by substantial research and explanation for 
why the particular type of private contractor (prison operators, in this exam-
ple) must be subject to public oversight via FOIA transparency.  But they are 
not accompanied by an explanation for why other private contractors are 
not similarly treated.  We seek herein to outline a framework which would 
require such considered decisionmaking. 
B. Replacing FOIA 
Some theorists argue that any document pertaining to official governmen-
tal purposes should be open to the public, regardless of whether it is privately 
71. See, e.g., Sekera, supra note 57; KUTTNER, supra note 1. 
72. Cf., e.g., Karen Bogenschneider & Elizabeth Gross, From Ivory Tower to State House: How 
Youth Theory Can Inform Youth Policy Making, 53 FAM. REL. 19, 22 (2004) (“A comprehensive, long-
term perspective too often is constrained by categorical funding streams, brief legislative ses-
sions, and election demands for immediate results.  Given these pressures, policy makers are 
forced into looking for quick solutions to complex problems, which result in piecemeal, magic-
bullet approaches.”); Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 93, 105 (1954) (criticizing the NLRB for preferring adjudication over other types of deci-
sion as “fragmentary in character, placing primary emphasis on the special facts of the single 
case, and focusing attention on one small facet of what is often a complex problem” and noting 
that such approaches “make[] perspective difficult [and] tend[] to obscure the fact that policy 
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or publicly produced.  The greatest merit to such proposals is that they 
properly focus on the nature of the document insofar as it concerns the gov-
ernment and the people, instead of restricting considerations to the producer 
of the document.  If a document is created in furtherance of a congressional 
mandate, the critical inquiry should focus on that relationship.   
But scholars who have proposed such comprehensive overhauls of 
FOIA—including but not limited to a complete rejection of the current 
framework—“hedge[] on the details,” in part because it is unclear what such 
an overhaul would involve.73  This becomes all the fuzzier when we look to 
expanding a transparency framework to private government.
Several such scholars argue that the reactive, request-driven FOIA regime 
should be jettisoned in favor of proactive disclosure requirements.74  We sup-
port and agree with the rationale underlying such proposals insofar as they 
seek to remedy FOIA’s shortcomings in government-held documents; as Pro-
fessor Pozen argues, the current system “is arguably reactionary in a more 
substantive, political sense insofar as it empowers opponents of regulation, 
distributes government goods in a regressive fashion, and contributes to a 
culture of contempt surrounding the domestic policy bureaucracy while in-
sulating the national security state from similar scrutiny.”75  Affirmative dis-
closure is a critical part of any public transparency regime, and we touch on 
some areas below where affirmative disclosure may be expanded.  Unlike our 
later discussion of affirmative disclosure, which provides targeted areas 
where corporations should be required to create information of public im-
portance (largely summaries of prior activities, such as political, safety, or 
environmental actions), Professor Pozen’s proposal targets mandatory disclo-
sure of government-held, already-created information. 
As our focus here is on private transparency, however, we must take into 
account the distinction between publicly and privately held information.  For 
all our arguments that the disclosure regime should focus on the importance 
of information to the public and not the character of the creator or holder, we 
also seek solutions that may be politically viable.  Indeed, in some cases it may 
be useful for the corporations themselves to have the protections that might 
flow from greater transparency when they are engaged in public duties.  
Moreover, while we believe the public importance should be driving disclo-
sure requirements, we would be remiss to ignore altogether the differences 
73. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1097, 1156 (2017); cf., e.g., Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing 
Back Full Disclosure: A Call for Dismantling FOIA, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 515, 517–19, 529 (2016). 
74. E.g., Pozen, supra note 73. 
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between public and private service providers.76
To wit, several of the justifications offered by Professor Pozen for affirma-
tive disclosures—which are well-developed and persuasive as applied to Pro-
fessor Pozen’s target area: traditional, publicly-held FOIA documents—do 
not fit nearly as neatly into the private provider context.  For example, Pro-
fessor Pozen argues that agencies may utilize already implemented govern-
ment online records systems to proactively distribute relevant documents.77
By their nature, private records holders are substantially less likely to have, 
or be willing to develop, turn-key ready disclosure systems that could be 
adapted to the types of disclosures addressed here.  Private entities communi-
cate with the public differently (through commercial advertisements, sales 
contacts, stock offerings, and the like) than public agencies, and these differ-
ences would increase political resistance and private cost should an affirma-
tive disclosure regime be imposed on private companies.  Our affirmative 
disclosure proposal below would filter privately-created information through 
the existing agency framework, taking advantage of the structures identified 
by Professor Pozen. 
Other concerns, which Professor Pozen worries may make affirmative dis-
closure requirements difficult in the public context, may prove insurmount-
able if applied across the board to private record holders.  Specifically, as 
Professor Pozen argues, affirmative disclosure requirements, just as the cur-
rent request-driven system, may “suffer from inattention [and] narrow con-
struction”;78 these issues are all the more likely to be exacerbated when profits 
are on the line for private entities. 
Finally, Professor Pozen warns of a regime which “produce[s] so much 
information as to overwhelm outside audiences, ultimately degrading rather 
than enhancing media coverage and public comprehension.”79  Given the 
amount of privately-produced information, this risk seems to be the greatest 
consideration against any broad affirmative disclosure requirement imposed 
on private record holders.  Private companies will have every incentive to 
bury the proverbial needle in the haystack while resisting meaningful disclo-
sure of any damaging information.  Public agencies, while perhaps frequently 
reticent to willingly disclose wrongdoing,80 at a minimum have an undeniable 
76. These differences, of course, suggest that private providers may not be suitable substitutes 
for public providers with regard to critical human services. E.g., Aman & Dugan, supra note 2. 
77. Pozen, supra note 73, at 1150–51, 1053–54. 
78. Id. at 1151. 
79. Id. at 1152. 
80. See Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More Effective 
FOIA Reform, 66 CATH. U.L. REV. 525, 533 (2017) (“[A]gencies have strong disincentives to 
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public mandate to do so, and political mechanisms exist for rectifying any 
failures to disclose. 
Moreover, assuming an affirmative disclosure policy for government-cre-
ated information manages to take root, it is not completely clear that a pri-
vate affirmative disclosure policy would be particularly helpful.  The public 
disclosure would provide notice of the fact of the contractual delegation, 
following which interested parties could seek the relevant, privately-held 
documents created pursuant to that delegation.  We contend below that fed-
eral, state, and local governments can and should expand mandatory private 
disclosures through already-existing devices such as permitting require-
ments, activity disclosures, and shareholder disclosures.81  These, as ex-
panded, would target the types of information most important to the public 
at large, leaving FOIA-style requests as a means to dig deeper into certain 
issues or as a compliment to the proposed public affirmative disclosure sys-
tem.82  That is, we see our proposed “private FOIA” system as potentially 
complementary to a public affirmative disclosure system, such as that pro-
posed by Professor Pozen.83
Other scholars propose a different type of “comprehensive” reform pro-
posal.  Laurence Tai’s suggestion, for example, focuses neither on extending 
FOIA to a specific industry nor on addressing anomalous transparency gaps 
left in FOIA.84  Rather, proposals such as Tai’s and others address narrow 
performance issues that undermine FOIA’s ability to effectively operate in its 
current scope.85  Tai proposes adjusting FOIA’s fees and fee-shifting provi-
sions to make compliance with commercial FOIA requests more cost-effec-
tive while ensuring that FOIA remains viable for private and public interest 
requesters.86  These issues, while undoubtedly important to the viability of 
the reforms we discuss here, are beyond the scope of this Article.  These pro-
posals demonstrate that FOIA’s incentive structure may be adjusted to work 
81. See infra Part III.A. 
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Tai, supra note 35, at 455. 
85. E.g., Gavoor & Miktus, supra note 80, at 542 (arguing that FOIA’s “provisions per-
mitting or requiring agency interpretation are inefficient because they are internally incon-
sistent with its de novo standard of review” and should be replaced with “more specific terms 
and provisions, thereby removing the necessity for agency interpretation”); Ira Bloom, Freedom 
of Information Laws in the Digital Age: The Death Knell of Informational Privacy, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
9, 1–2 (2006) (noting risk of intrusion into individuals’ privacy interests due to abuse of digital 
state and federal FOIA databases). 
86. Tai, supra note 35, at 455 (proposing to “allow[] agencies to retain processing fees, 
increase[] these fees, especially for commercial and expedited requests, and strengthen[] 
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substantial justice without overburdening the administrative state with purely 
commercial requests. 
Comprehensive overhauls to the existing FOIA framework are aspira-
tional.  But as a practical matter, particularly in the short term, the devil truly 
lies in the details—and undoubtedly in the difficulty of achieving bipartisan 
support for any large changes in this political climate.87  These proposals, in 
their current forms, are not necessarily readymade for the types of private 
governance we have been discussing.88
The scholarship thus far proposes encouraging affirmative disclosure re-
gimes to remedy many of FOIA’s shortcomings as currently applied to public 
governmental actors.  But the difficulties in mapping such a regime on to 
private operators confirm that private government, while parallel to public 
government and wielding important authority, operates in a different space 
from public government, with different expectations and goals.89  An affirm-
87. Pozen, supra note 73, at 1156–57 (arguing that request-driven model should be aban-
doned in favor of proactive disclosure model but declining to argue “whether FOIA requests 
ought to phased out wherever feasible or retained in some modified form” and remaining 
“genuinely ambivalent about how far to take [the article’s] arguments”); cf., e.g., Stewart & 
Davis, supra note 73, at 537  (positing similar affirmative disclosure thesis, but leaving the “de-
tails and intricacies” of disclosure “portals,” as well as “getting the legislative language just 
right to balance the incentives and consequences,” to future scholars); Michael Herz, Law Lags 
Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577, 
578–79 (2009) (arguing that “FOIA’s fundamental limitation is its failure to impose affirmative 
responsibilities on agencies” but acknowledging that “[r]eimagining the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act is far beyond the scope of this brief [a]rticle”). 
88. See authorities cited supra note 87. 
89. The burgeoning literature on transnational law helps to explore and explain the in-
terrelatedness of the degrees and shade of public and private, recognizing that the dichotomy 
has disintegrated into “new forms of authority, legitimacy, and political mobilization.”  AMAN
& GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 44.  Transnational law appreciates that the “principal ve-
hicles of transnational governance” extends beyond traditional sources of law (constitutions 
and statutes) to, for example, “treaties and agreements; supply chain contracts and industry 
codes and standards; and the voluntary norms and procedures associated with global govern-
ance institutions.” Id.; see also Henry Mintzberg, The U.S. Cannot Be Run Like a Business, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Mar. 31, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-u-s-cannot-be-run-like-a-business
(“A healthy society balances the power of respected governments in the public sector with 
both responsible businesses in the private sector and robust communities in what I call the 
plural sector—the clubs, religions, community hospitals, foundations, NGOs, and coopera-
tives with which so many of us engage.”); Oren Perez, Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New 
Transnational Legal Body, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2007) (“The classic doctrines of interna-
tional law, with their focus on sovereignty, state consent, custom, and treaty, do not provide a 
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ative disclosure model makes sense for public agencies because they are de-
signed, from the ground up, for public service.90  This goal serves as a ready 
justification for using existing public disclosure-oriented portals to facilitate 
such a transformative reform.  By contrast, the private organizations which 
collectively operate in the private government are designed primarily (solely?) 
for profit.91  As such, their organizational structures are ill-suited to a broad 
affirmative disclosure regime, at least without sacrificing the putative benefits 
(largely economic efficiency) of private-public partnerships.92  While a reac-
tionary FOIA-type framework and additional mandatory reporting require-
ments may help to mitigate the transparency deficit with respect to private 
organizations recruited to serve the public good, these differences demon-
strate that transparency and democracy are almost unavoidably sacrificed 
when public services are contractually delegated. 
As we demonstrate below, particularly in Part IV, private government has 
limitations.93  Thus, while we endeavor to close the transparency deficit, we 
believe that the profit-directed ends of private organizations dictate that, ul-
timately, politicians and courts will have to draw a line between what may 
properly be delegated and what must be off-limits.  To reiterate, current gov-
erning practice prioritizes outsourcing and offloading responsibility for pub-
lic actions ranging from firefighting to airport security94 to legislation incor-
porating by reference international “standards” which may preclude even 
legal universe.  The contemporary legal terrain seems to be characterized by overlapping ju-
risdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations, and competing worldviews.”). 
90. Cf. Mintzberg, supra note 89. 
91. Cf. id.; Verkuil, supra note 10, at 468 (“The values behind public service help animate 
the public-private distinction.  When private contractors perform inherent government func-
tions, they jeopardize core values of public law and weaken government’s capacity to do the 
common good.”); McLean, supra note 7, at 375–77 (describing metamorphosis of the corpo-
ration from origin as a “creation[] of the state” with “public purpose” to modern characteri-
zation grounded in “public/private distinction”). 
92. For a comprehensive critique of these alleged benefits, see, for example, KUTTNER,
supra note 1, and David Hall & Tue Anh Nguyen, Economic Benefits of Public Services, REAL-
WORLD ECON. REV., June 19, 2018, at 101 (“There is now extensive experience of all forms 
of privatization, and many studies, surveys, overviews and meta-reviews, whose results repeat-
edly find no evidence that the private sector is intrinsically more efficient.”). 
93. See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Overdoses, Bedsores, Broken 
Bones: What Happened When a Private-Equity Firm Sought to Care for Society’s Most Vulnerable, WASH.










      09/18/2019   13:09:53
adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 18 Side B      09/18/2019   13:09:53
C M
Y K
ALR 71.3_AMAN & ROOKARD_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)_ME FORMATTING 8/28/19 6:32 PM
460 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [71:3 
the well-to-do from meaningfully participating in essentially-political pro-
cesses.95  These forms of “outsourcing,” and the divergent forms of privati-
zation we address below extend far beyond the provision of services to dele-
gation of discretionary decisionmaking on matters of quintessentially political 
importance.  If nothing else, the transparency proposals we contemplate 
should help generate the evidentiary record upon which both voters and 
courts may rely in drawing this line. 
C. Refining FOIA 
We have already discussed Senator Cardin’s proposal for extending FOIA 
to private prisons—a proposal that injects public law (the FOIA framework) 
into public-private outsourcing relationships by using the quintessential 
mechanism of private law: the contract.96  Senator Cardin’s proposal pro-
vides a roadmap that can and should be generalized to most if not all areas 
of privatization by contract.  And we surmise that there is no reason for FOIA 
to stop at contracts—similar frameworks may be amenable to inclusion in 
trade agreements and treaties.  In short, wherever the government is a party 
to an agreement, it has the prerogative and responsibility to include pro-
transparency provisions, and we propose a path to help this occur.  
Scholars, including Aman, for some time now have recognized that pri-
vate companies could be required, via contract, to open their activities to 
public scrutiny.97  Professor Sarah Lamdan, for example, has built on this 
at Smaller Airports, CNN (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:14 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/01/poli 
tics/tsa-considering-eliminating-screening-at-smaller-airports/index.html. But see Verkuil, su-
pra note 10, at 445–48 (describing the relocation of airport screening from the private sector 
to the public in the wake of the September 11, 2001; if, however, the 2001 attacks provided 
the impetus for reassessing private control of airport security, then perhaps the renewed move-
ment to privatize and trim down government involvement in airport security may be due in 
part to the long lull in catastrophic terrorist attacks since 2001). 
95. See discussion supra note 10. 
96. See supra Part II.A. 
97. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261–62 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); e.g., Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale, supra note 60, at 251–
52; Jody Freeman, Symposium, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1285, 1328 (2003) (“Although contracts between government and service provid-
ers take the form of traditional private-law contracts, and need to be attractive enough in their 
terms to entice private providers to bid for them, these agreements tend to be more unilateral 
in design than contracts between two private parties: government generally establishes the 
terms and providers generally agree to them. Thus, there is room to introduce more give-
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idea to argue that such a private FOIA provision could permit closer super-
vision of the environmental impact of contractor activities.98  We seek to gen-
eralize a private FOIA regime beyond particular areas, such as private pris-
ons or the environment, and in so doing propose a modification to address 
several concerns interposed in opposition to this concept.  Specifically, we 
propose below a private FOIA wherein the contracting agency retains own-
ership, following ex ante consideration of transparency factors, of the critical 
public information.  The resulting “FOIA requests” would seek information 
not directly from the private company but instead from the agency regarding 
the contractor’s activities.  We discuss below what this may look like, and 
how it can balance countervailing considerations of nongovernmental pri-
vacy, like trade secrets and efficiency. 
Given that outsourcing occurs by contract, there is a great deal of flexibil-
ity when it comes to negotiating those contracts with prospective private pro-
viders.  Two readily available, legally-binding mechanisms exist to encourage 
transparency provisions—passage of a contracting-out statute or, as a less 
attractive alternative (because the policy could be altered with a mere switch 
in administration), an executive order.  Such an executive order could en-
hance OMB’s review of agency actions by requiring, along with cost-benefit 
concerns, a transparency analysis as well—the lack of FOIA or provisions 
excluding FOIA should be evaluated as a cost to be justified.99  A further 
plaining how private law can inject the public into outsourcing contracts, what she calls “pub-
licization,” id. at 1285, by drilling down into how to make private governance more transpar-
ent—a condition precedent to increased accountability.  We also take this opportunity to 
demonstrate, through the transparency case studies, that privatization can extend to sover-
eignty and authority itself, and we further develop the limitations acknowledged by Professor 
Freeman on the publicization-by-contract idea.
98. Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale, supra note 60, at 251. 
99. Imposing systemic regulatory changes (such as the one we propose) by executive or-
der is far from unprecedented.  To take one example, consider Executive Order 12,866, which 
famously requires agencies to promulgate only those regulations “required by law” or “com-
pelling public need” and to “assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, 
including the alternative of not regulating.”  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 
51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).  It further requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to evaluate all major regulatory ac-
tions to ensure that the cost-benefit calculus is followed. See id.  For one particularly rosy 
review of Executive Order 12,866, with an interesting explanation for the Order’s staying 
power across administrations from both major parties, see the thoughts of George W. Bush’s 
OIRA Administrator, Susan E. Dudley, Happy Birthday, Executive Order 12866!, FORBES (Sept. 
24, 2018, 8:57 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2018/09/24/happy-
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possibility, particularly in light of a political climate in which transparency is 
regarded as an anathema, is for individual agencies to adopt, as internal op-
erating procedures or formal regulations, the expectation that outsourcing 
contracts contain such a provision.100
As proposed by many FOIA reformers, we could begin with the premise 
that any non-exempt document created pursuant to a government contract 
is subject to FOIA, but still permit the agencies, ex ante, to expressly define 
and justify exceptions and exclusions where other legitimate interests out-
weigh those of public disclosure.  It may be the duties are not significant from 
a public point of view—a contract to mow lawns for example.101  But a statute 
could set out the broad criteria involved, and a decision to bypass some or all 
of FOIA would need reasons that could be subject to judicial review and 
public scrutiny.
that cost-benefit principles, and more generally principles of government responsibility, trans-
cend partisan lines.  So too do (or should) issues of government transparency.  Id.
100. See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1245 (2017) (“[W]e argue that, far from condemning internal administrative law, 
the APA embraced it . . . Unfortunately, this feature of the APA is one that courts often have 
ignored . . . At the same time, pressures for centralized White House control have led to the 
displacement of agencies’ own internal law into versions of internal law that stem from central 
offices within the executive branch.”). 
101. It is important to note that the existing law exempts “matter[s] relating to pub-
lic . . . contracts” from the APA’s procedural requirements.  5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012).  
There is no differentiation made between types or the importance of contracts—a contract to 
outsource the painting of agency hearing rooms is the same as a contract to outsource the 
agency’s regulatory duties. Cf. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking 
Related to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 571 (1970) 
(“First, rulemaking of the kind exempted by subsection (a)(2) intimately affects millions of 
Americans in their daily lives, and is one of the most important and frequently used means by 
which our national government seeks to solve our pressing social, economic, and environmen-
tal problems . . . Second, the exemption of rulemaking relating to ‘public property, loans, 
grants, benefits, or contracts’ also creates a special danger that certain important government 
agencies may, as entities, become out of touch with and unresponsive to public needs.”).  It is 
as if all contracting out is trivial.  But that exception was written at a time when it was assumed 
that the statutory duties of the agency would be carried out only by the agency itself.  See, e.g.,
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on Government Social Service Contracts: Out-
sourcing Prison Health Care in New York City, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 315 (2007) 
(explaining genesis of the APA exemption and the evolution of “[r]eliance on the market for 
the actual provision of government services [which] coincide[d] with technological changes 
that have spurred deregulation throughout the 1980s and 1990s . . . .”).  The erosion and 
eventual evisceration of that assumption underscores the need for the types of provisions we 
discuss here—and, ultimately, the need for a new administrative law which is built from the 
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The Cardin bill could thus be generalized to apply to all agencies that 
contract out all or a portion of their duties to a private entity, whether or not 
they involve private prisons.  This would put the onus on the agencies to 
include contractual provisions incorporating FOIA in any outsourcing con-
tract they negotiate.  At a minimum, our statutory or regulatory framework 
would require that transparency and public access be addressed as part of 
the bargaining process.  To the extent the “FOIA provision” is omitted or 
significantly modified, it needs to be explained.  Meaningful judicial review 
requires some explanation of why a decision was made.   
Whether the contractual provision should emulate Senator Cardin’s “in-
corporate FOIA” provision, contain other language, or perhaps be open to 
different types of transparency requirements (consistent with reasonable ex-
ercise of agency discretion) is a question that can be determined ad hoc.  Are 
different levels of transparency appropriate based upon the nature of the ac-
tivities being outsourced?  Perhaps at this stage, such complexity can be de-
ferred since the existing FOIA exemptions may be tinkered with to address 
private interests.102
In addition to the private interest concerns, which we have largely ad-
dressed above and which may be adequately accommodated by the current 
exemption-based framework, the greatest hurdle our proposed system faces 
is system gridlock.  Already, FOIA requests overburden underfunded agen-
cies.103  Adding a private FOIA framework on top, complete with judicial 
102. For example, a provision could read as simply as: 
All contracts entered into by an Agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 552(f)(1) shall 
presumptively include the following provision: “All information produced pursuant to 
this contract is subject to disclosure consistent with the provisions in 5 U.S.C. § 552.” 
Except that such an Agency may omit or modify this provision if the Agency determines 
that the contract is not substantially likely to produce information that would be subject 
to disclosure if produced by the Agency itself.  An Agency omitting or modifying this 
provision must additionally make publicly available a statement justifying the omission 
or modification within seven (7) days of the execution of the contract.  The statement 
shall be published in the Federal Register and subject to judicial review consistent with 
5 U.S.C. § 706. 
We argue that the existing, politically acceptable structures from FOIA may be used to 
shed greater light on the “submerged” state, SEKERA, supra note 58, at 1, recognizing 
that retooling of the exemption-based structure is already necessary to ensure that even 
critical government-created documents will be publicly disclosed. See authorities cited 
supra note 52. 
103. Stephanie Alvarez-Jones, Note, “Too Big to FOIA”: How Agencies Avoid Compliance with 
the Freedom of Information Act, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1057 & nn.8–10 (2018) (“Backlogs 
and insufficient resources present significant challenges to the execution of agencies’ duties 
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review for contractual exemptions, threatens to further burden these systems.  
And in an era where the administration strips down agencies as a means to 
deregulate—leaving agencies without the resources to fulfill their statutory 
mandates—these concerns are not without significant force.104
These are not insurmountable concerns.  They do not justify the status 
quo.  Nor do they justify making a Cardin FOIA provision mandatory in all 
outsourcing contracts.  As we have suggested, not all outsourcing is created 
equal.  Consistent with the principle that transparency should reflect the pub-
lic impact of the information (and not the private or public label attached to 
the purported decision maker), documents relating to private-public school 
partnerships should be easily accessible, but those pertaining to a gardening 
contract perhaps could be partially exempt.  However, these concerns high-
light the delicate balance that our proposed framework must strike.  We pro-
pose a few methods to mitigate these concerns.
First, a critical part of our framework is outlining the types of information 
that should be nonnegotiable.  We can sketch a few categories that seem to 
fit this definition: information which directly impacts public services (i.e., pol-
icies guiding direct government-public interactions105) and information upon 
which an agency intends to rely on formal or informal decisionmaking.  
These two categories, which we believe could be fleshed out sufficiently to 
serve as workable guideposts, suffer from some of the same problems as those 
posited by reformers who wish to completely overhaul the FOIA frame-
work—they could prove nebulous in practice.  We could add a third, with 
the caveat that it may need to be otherwise tempered by robust exemptions: 
courts’ persistent application of outdated recordkeeping standards to modern electronic data-
bases, are even greater hindrances to the law’s purpose.”). 
104. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The 2017 Roscoe Pound Lecture, The Limits of Executive Power: 
The Obama-Trump Transition, 96 NEB. L. REV. 545, 550 (2017) (“It appears as if this budget seeks 
to dramatically cut funding for the agencies, signaling President Trump’s de-regulatory 
agenda.”).  As one practical example, President Trump has taken an exceedingly leisurely ap-
proach to appointing agency leaders. See, e.g., Lisa Rein, Slow Pace of Trump Nominations Leaves 
Cabinet Agencies ‘Stuck’ In Staffing Limbo, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/politics/slow-pace-of-trump-nominations-leaves-cabinet-agencies-stuck-in-staffing-
limbo/2017/04/25/0a150aba-252c-11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html; Tracking How 
Many Key Positions Trump Has Filled So Far, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database/.  As one 
scholar observes, such “extensive vacancies” “contribute to agency inaction, foster confusion 
among nonpolitical employees, and undermine agency legitimacy.”  Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2009). 
105. Among the areas implicating direct government-public interactions are, for exam-
ple, public safety operations, including fire, policing, and transportation; prison operations; 
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information which, if created by the agency itself, would be subject to disclo-
sure under FOIA, and a fourth: information created with funding provided 
by the federal government.
These latter two categories may prove the easiest to administer.  They 
would also encourage agencies, if they wished to create categorical excep-
tions, to provide robust, ex ante analyses for why certain categories of docu-
ments should not be subject to the private FOIA.  For example, agencies 
might reasonably exclude from the private FOIA provisions information cre-
ated pursuant to, or involving the purchase of, contracts for office supplies or 
building maintenance.  The traditional “public FOIA” would remain in full 
effect, but the private contractor would not have to open up its books or oth-
erwise respond to public requests for information.  The categorical nature of 
these exclusions would encourage early resolution of any debates about the 
reasonableness of the exclusions, subject to some form of review, without ne-
cessitating—or at least minimizing—case-by-case objections.  Clear congres-
sional directives would further aid in managing these concerns.106
Finally, as a promising alternative to forcing private contractors to open 
up their books upon request, Congress or the president via executive order, 
can and should put the onus on agencies not only to negotiate for transpar-
ency provisions, but to negotiate for actual ownership of information created 
pursuant to a public-private contract.107  This solution would advance several 
important goals.  First, it would properly diversify the cost analysis that agen-
cies are already required to take under existing law by requiring agencies to 
account for the delegation of control and decisionmaking that necessarily ac-
companies contractual delegation.  Second, it would at least acknowledge 
detractors’ concerns that “productive and innovative private organizations” 
may have regarding the “invasion of privacy, the added work, and the ex-
pense required to comply.”108  Third, it would again reinforce the duties of 
106. Similarly, the executive could negotiate for similar transparency provisions in inter-
national treaties and documents promulgated by transnational authorities. 
107. And, though not necessarily a matter of privatization by contract, statutes or reg-
ulations incorporating private-created standards by reference should require the govern-
ment to retain ownership not only over the texts themselves, but of the supporting docu-
mentation and any other records of debates, hearings, or reports to allow for meaningful 
judicial review and political scrutiny. Cf. ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 1 (proposing a resolution urging Congress to amend the APA 
“to require ‘meaningful free public availability’ of all text incorporated by reference into 
proposed and final substantive rules of general applicability” and to “ensure that private 
organizations would, where appropriate, have access to compensation for financial losses 
attributable to this requirement”). 
108. Jeffrey A. Ware, Note, Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter: How 
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government agencies to serve the public and avoid assigning private compa-
nies with the somewhat counterintuitive tasks of looking beyond their profit-
driven ends. 
All three sets of concerns—transparency, private privacy interests, and di-
recting accountability concerns to the public sector—could be assessed, 
openly and in advance, to ensure that the publicly-relevant information 
would be subject to the ordinary public FOIA rules, with no need to intrude 
upon the private entity’s books.  To the extent such a rule would force private 
companies to take special measures to transfer ownership of the relevant in-
formation without disclosing irrelevant trade secrets or the like, we observe 
that private companies are already accustomed to having to comply with 
special bidding and certification procedures, for example, when seeking busi-
ness from governmental entities.109  Our proposal would simply expand and 
provide another layer to these obligations. 
In this way, our proposal gets at the heart of the problem of privatization 
by injecting public authority into an otherwise private state.  The legitimate 
need for such measures suggests that the accountability limitations of private 
government—the result of delegation of sovereign authority—are part of the 
character of the private providers themselves and ultimately reach a terminus 
where the state must be returned.  And our proposals are merely a stepping 
stone to achieving the embeddedness that we ultimately maintain is essential 
under larger principles of fairness, due process, and democratic legitimacy.  
To whom is the government accountable?  The profit-driven, unelected pri-
vate sector, or the multi-concerned public?110  If nothing else, forcing the 
state-as-delegator to own—literally—its contractual delegations will at least 
enable the voting public to make this decision for itself. 
III. PRIVATIZATION BEYOND CONTRACTING
The private FOIA scheme we have proposed is limited to privatization by 
contract.  While most privatization is accompanied by contract, many crucial 
private-public relationships are less formal, though equally impactful.  This 
is particularly the case once we expand our lens to look at nontraditional 
“private governance,” to include issues such as environmental protection and 
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741, 766 (2010). 
109. See, e.g., Robert S. Metzger & Michael J. Scanlon, Sarbanes-Oxley and Government Con-
tractors: Beyond the Regulatory Burden We Knew, 41 PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2006, at 10 (ob-
serving that government contractors are already impacted by and complying with acts like 
Sarbanes-Oxley).
110. Cf. KUTTNER, supra note 1, at 309 (“The challenge is for public institutions to be as 
resilient as commercial ones, and to mobilize the latent power of popular democracy to keep 
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labor regulation.111  And we may expand our lens with good reason.  A great 
many of the global deregulatory regimes in these areas have been foisted 
upon domestic and local governments by transnational organizations de-
signed and captured by purely private financial interests.112
Thus, we now turn to situations where the individual acts not necessarily 
as a consumer of privatized governmental services, but as a citizen qua citi-
zen who is impacted by the regulations (or absence of regulations) imposed 
upon private entities who pay wages, affect the environment, and sell goods 
and services.  In other respects, the government purports to act just as any 
other private entity, contracting to sell its resources and enterprises to the 
highest bidder.113
But the government is, of course, not just any other market participant.114
Rather, it has a historical and normative responsibility to address collective 
problems.  Where it instead delegates or “privatizes” the responsibility for 
doing so to nonpublic entities, the private actors’ actions must be subject to 
public scrutiny.  The other approaches we have discussed may be used to 
111. See generally AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 51–208 (collecting authorities).  
We may add to these two issues the regulation of airworthiness of commercial airliners, with 
the ongoing saga of whether the Boeing 737 MAX was rushed to market without appropriate 
vetting. See, e.g., Dominic Gates, Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the 
Suspect 737 MAX Flight Control System, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019, 9:46 A.M.), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-saf
ety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ (“The FAA, citing lack of 
funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on 
more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes. Early on in certification of the 
737 MAX, the FAA safety engineering team divided up the technical assessments that would 
be delegated to Boeing versus those they considered more critical and would be retained 
within the FAA.”); Matthew Yglesias, The Emerging 737 Max Scandal, Explained, VOX (Mar. 29, 
2019, 9:10 A.M.), https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2019/3/29/18281270/737- 
max-faa-scandal-explained. 
112. AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 51–208 (collecting authorities); KUTTNER,
supra note 1, at 197–201. 
113. Cf., e.g., Wentong Zheng, Untangling the Market and the State, 67 EMORY L.J. 243, 245 
(2017) (“[T]he government is also emerging as a major participant in market activities.  
Among other things, governments own corporations, employ workers, and buy large amounts 
of goods and services.”). 
114. Compare id. at 245, with FOIA Counselor, FOIA Update: Disclosure of Prices, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (Jan. 1, 1981), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-disclosure-prices
(“There is a different standard in dealings with the government.  In the private sector, disclo-
sure of salaries or prices is usually at the option of the parties.  But the common principle—
where the government is a party—is that neither individual privacy nor private commercial 
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shed light on some of the actions of this private state.  In other words, trans-
parency needs and solutions are not one size fits all. 
To plug the transparency gaps in situations that do not necessarily involve 
privatization by contract, we embrace the spirit of the categorical and ad hoc 
solutions we discussed earlier.  We describe these situations with case studies 
that should serve as examples for analogous scenarios.  Section A proposes 
expanding the use of mandatory public disclosures to convey important in-
formation in areas of public impact.  Section B discusses the need for ad hoc 
solutions to address the future privatization of public sector enterprises, such 
as U.S. Postal Service (USPS), AMTRAK, or public utilities.  The examples 
we touch on underscore the difficulties in relying upon private corporations 
to take into account important public interest factors (such as long-term en-
vironmental impact) that may be antithetical to the bottom line.  They also 
reinforce what Part II made clear: privatization, broadly considered, can 
have deleterious impacts far beyond the marginalized and underprivileged.  
Poisoned lakes, opaque financial systems, and minimized public greenspace 
can impact the affluent and indigent alike. 
A. Mandatory Disclosures 
Mandatory disclosure schemes come in many shapes and sizes.  In the 
environmental context, for example, laws and regulations require environ-
mental impact statements in conjunction with certain high-impact activities; 
workplace hazard disclosures; product labeling, covering a range of im-
portant information; and accounting disclosures as part of investment or tax 
reporting.115  FOIA is not currently designed to reach these areas, as it is 
designed only to allow private persons to access documents that have already 
been created.  Disclosure laws require the companies to compile or create 
the information to begin with. 
One theory underlying these mandatory disclosures is the refrain that we 
have been repeating throughout: this information is of such great importance 
to the public that it must be disclosed regardless of who created it.116  Disclo-
sures, either to the government, which may act upon them or disseminate 
them as appropriate, or directly to the public, serve as another means of 
providing information about what the government is up to where the gov-
ernment has effectively delegated its authority to monitor or regulate to pri-
vate companies.  Where the government requires disclosures of information, 
115. See Peter H. Sand, The Right to Know: Freedom of Environmental Information in Comparative 
and International Law, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 203, 204–05 (2011).






      09/18/2019   13:09:53
adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 23 Side A      09/18/2019   13:09:53
C M
Y K
ALR 71.3_AMAN & ROOKARD_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)_ME FORMATTING 8/28/19 6:32 PM
2019] PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE TRANSPARENCY DEFICIT 469 
it surely could instead insist upon governmental audits or inspections to ac-
quire the same information.  The choice of a disclosure system is accurately 
characterized as a less intrusive and lower cost means of regulation.  Such 
systems can and should be expanded to other critical areas where private 
companies engage in regulable—but unregulated or underregulated—activ-
ities that likewise impact the public.
A key theoretical justification for such disclosures first requires acknowl-
edging the true public-private history of the corporate entity.  As Professor 
Jane McLean explains, the notion of a “purely private” company is a wholly 
modern idea, divorced from the history of the corporation as a public-ori-
ented creature.117  This is consistent, moreover, with the limited liability com-
promise.  Private entities garner substantial benefits from incorporation, not 
the least of which is protection from personal liability for the individual share-
holders.  But this status is a creature of “positive and not natural law”;118
“corporations are created by states or by the operation of law.”119  These 
tradeoffs provide ample ground for insisting upon democracy-enhancing 
transparency benefits, particularly where a single, multinational company 
can impact the return of the national economy, influence employee compen-
sation, and either protect or destroy the environments upon which citizens 
depend for water.  Phrased differently, the balance has skewed too heavily in 
favor of untouchable corporate personhood and against the government’s 
ability to protect public rights.  One consequence of this rhetoric of the nat-
ural corporate person is that governments have become hamstrung by doc-
trines initially designed with individual protection in mind.  Transparency, 
moreover, is simply the first—though potentially dispositive—hurdle in em-
powering the citizen to make the democratic decisions as to where lines must 
be drawn as far as regulations on corporate responsibility.  Citizens cannot 
fix problems or respond to facts, risks, and vulnerabilities about which they 
do not know. 
The practical challenges in establishing a functioning transparency 
framework to restore a bit of public oversight over corporatist interests are 
twofold: the first is identifying areas where disclosure is desirable and appro-
priate, considering the value of the information to the public against the cost 
of its aggregation and production as well as any legitimate need for privacy.  
The second is constructing a system for disclosure.  The forms of environ-
mental disclosure listed above cover a wide range of subject and forms, in-
cluding direct-to-public disclosures (product labelling), disclosure targeted 
117. McLean, supra note 7, at 375. 
118. Id. at 376. 
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to particularly interested groups (workplace disclosures), and disclosures fil-
tered through the government (environmental impact reports and disclo-
sures in financial reports).  Disclosure laws therefore provide a broad arsenal 
of tools that may be targeted to strike the best balance of private and public 
interests, emphasizing the need to identify and remedy underserved public 
interests.
We seek here to sketch several possible subjects warranting further disclo-
sure and methods to accomplish that disclosure.  This task is worthwhile in a 
case study on delegations of sovereignty and the implications that corporate 
opacity has in a free-market dominated democracy.  When corporations act 
without accountability, and when those same corporations have captured the 
domestic and transnational governing authorities that dictate social respon-
sibility standards, the democracy deficits deepens.  We highlight these prob-
lems and possible ways forward while leaving to future scholars the task of 
delineating the details. 
1. Financial Reports 
Companies, as part of investor disclosures and tax documents, are already 
required to disclose a wide array of information to the government and di-
rectly to investors.  For example, the Emergency Planning & Community 
Right-to-Know Act120 imposes “mandatory reporting requirements of toxic 
industrial emissions.”121  The data is compiled and made publicly available 
on a website.  As Professor Peter Sand observes, 
The net effect of all these developments has been to bring important environmental 
data held by the private/corporate sector into the public domain and thus “to render 
information less a private good (for enterprise) than a public one.”  Among the most 
effective “multiplier” instruments for this purpose, because they affect all public 
companies listed on the stock market, are environmental disclosure requirements in 
corporate financial accounting (stakeholder/shareholder risk disclosure).  For example, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has since 1971 required filings of 
environmentally relevant information as part of its regulations concerning mandatory 
annual reports under Form 10-K.122
This model is readily adaptable to other types of information of critical pub-
lic importance, as a consequence of the use of public stock markets or the priv-
ilege of incorporation (and attendant limitations on personal liability).123  As 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (2012). 
121. Sand, supra note 115, at 209–10.
122. Id. at 228–29. 
123. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires that publicly-listed companies provide 
disclosures on mine safety, payments to foreign governments by companies who mine or drill, 
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just a few additional examples, we may decide that markets and shareholders 
should know where companies are donating their money and require disclo-
sures of all moneys donated above a certain threshold to any 501(c)(3) or (4) 
companies. Or perhaps companies should disclose labor and employment 
practices, detailing the percentage of employees employed at or near mini-
mum wage. We could also require disclosures as to corporate structure, in-
cluding the use of wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries, domestic or for-
eign; use of independent contractors; and other information regarding 
international operations. 
The idea that this information may be critical to investors (as a helpful 
starting place) is far from novel.  Beginning as early as the 1970s, investors 
began looking to the ethics of investing as both a moral and economic matter, 
with the idea that a corporation’s unethical behavior could well produce del-
eterious results—if not necessarily in the short term, then in the long term.124
For example, institutional investors divested from companies operating in 
apartheid-era South Africa in an effort to change their behavior.125  Business 
practices premised solely on short-term benefits to investors may have peri-
lous long-term results—both in terms of the corporation’s responsibility to its 
investors and its larger impact on society.  For example, British Petroleum, 
Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 327, 327–28 (2011).  These are important examples of the types of behaviors that 
may be subject to disclosure through financial reports, though the execution of these provisions 
has drawn criticism.  For example, the conflict mineral provision has been criticized for 
“creat[ing] a de facto embargo on mineral trade.”  Jeremy C. Jeffrey, Tungsten Is Forever: Conflict 
Minerals, Dodd-Frank, and the Need for A European Response, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 
503 04 (2012).  This is because, under the act, companies must comply with disclosure and 
auditing obligations whenever they cannot affirmatively confirm that they did not use conflict 
minerals from the Congo region. Id. at 504.  According to one analysis, “[c]orporations . . . find 
it easier to simply purchase minerals elsewhere than deal with the procedures required to ensure 
minerals are conflict-free,” id., harming the artisanal miners who instead are frequently forced 
to sell their minerals on the black market, id. at 510 11.  These types of unintended conse-
quences mandate careful balancing of incentives—but this should not dissuade efforts to ex-
pand transparency provisions.  A competing analysis has concluded that Dodd-Frank regula-
tions have “improve[d] conditions in the DRC,” Remi Moncel, Cooperating Alone: The Global 
Reach of U.S. Regulations on Conflict Minerals, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216, 230 (2016), and points 
to the beneficial carrot of permitting companies that go through the effort of verifying the eth-
icality of their supply chain to brand themselves as “conflict free,” id. at 229 (“The new regula-
tions have prompted companies to map their supply chains to an unprecedented extent.”). 
124. E.g., Inv. Strategies Comm., Investing with a Conscience, 21 EXPERIENCE, no. 1, 2011, 
at 12, 12. 
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in its conduct leading to the 2011 oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, “appar-
ently felt that the returns to the shareholder required some kind of cost con-
trol over safety so there were a number of decisions as reported in the press 
where certain kinds of safety devices were not installed or were not repaired 
in order to increase the returns.  That clearly was a bad long-term choice.”126
The more information the market may receive about such practices, the 
greater the ability the investing and consuming public has to vote with its 
wallet and express its disapproval.
While it is already an established practice to require useful public disclo-
sures as part of securities regulation—a scheme which could be expanded 
to include other information of similar import to the environmental disclo-
sures already required—we may similarly expand information disclosures as 
part of the privilege of incorporation or doing business with a municipal-
ity.127  Indeed, one of the clearest drawbacks to piggybacking disclosures 
with investment documents is that many corporations are closely held, and 
the actions of these companies are no less important than those of publicly 
traded corporations.  Moreover, requiring disclosures as part of an incorpo-
ration scheme would require regulations at the state level, where national 
coordination is far more difficult.128  Nonetheless, incorporation provides 
substantial benefits (personal liability protection) to the private entity’s stake-
holders, and states can and should demand some information in return for 
those benefits.  This information could easily be included as part of tax fil-
ings or other regularly filed documents, and likewise be properly cabined to 
companies of a certain size or engaged in certain industries.  In short, the 
information produced by financial markets need not reflect only economic 
considerations but should reflect important social information as part of the 
public’s right to know. 
126. Id. at 15. 
127. As one potentially promising case study unfolding at this time, the City of Los Angeles 
has recently passed a new law requiring that contractors disclose any connections to the Na-
tional Rifle Association, on the grounds that “providing public funds to NRA-linked contractors 
undermines efforts to promote gun safety in Los Angeles.”  Jonathan Stempel, NRA Sues Los 
Angeles Over Law Requiring Disclosure of Ties to Gun Rights Group, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2019, 9:40 
A.M.), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-los-angeles-nra-lawsuit/nra-sues-los-angeles-over 
-law-requiring-disclosure-of-ties-to-gun-group idUSKCN1S01XF. 
 128. But see Moncel, supra note 123, at 231–33 (describing the “California Effect,” which 
is the ability of one political subdivision “to impose its regulatory policies on other [subdivi-
sions] and on companies in a way that leads to a global harmonization of standards and prac-
tices,” frequently “because businesses find it economically advantageous to standardize their 
practices globally to follow a single rule” and then “lobby their home governments to level the 
playing field with their domestic competitors”).  In other words, Moncel suggests that regula-
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2. Permitting
All sorts of private projects require permits and concomitant disclosures, 
such as environmental impact studies and the like.129  A great many of these 
requirements are imposed at the federal and state level.  But particularly at 
the state and local levels, governmental authorities could demand more in-
formation as part of, for example, granting a large development permit to a 
“big box” store.  Already it is not unheard of for groups to rally and challenge 
openings of stores like Walmart, citing any number of legitimate concerns.130
The information required should shine even more light on corporations that 
wish to operate in states and communities, allowing the localities more infor-
mation in deciding whether to welcome such corporations with open arms.  
As with reporting requirements, permitting disclosures may include not 
only information about the contours of the particular project, but also infor-
mation about the company’s employment and labor history, environmental 
history, political activity, and the like.  In the end these disclosures would 
serve not so much as a means of deciding which entities could occupy certain 
spaces, but would inform the public about the nature of their new neighbor’s 
behaviors and allow the public to evaluate them accordingly. 
Permitting can also be a source of opacity, particularly when it takes the 
form of broad exemptions from critical environmental regulations.131  The 
129. See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of 
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 149–60 (2014) (“Permitting is one 
of the workhorses of the administrative state from top to bottom, and for centuries it has 
reached into every corner of life in America.”). 
130. See, e.g., Andre M. Larkins, Community Rights: Fighting the Walmart Invasion of Small Town 
America with Legal Intelligence, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 407, 410–12 
(2015) (“[C]ommunities nationwide have successfully opposed unwanted Walmart invasions 
for over two decades . . . In Red Bluff, California, residents waged a ten-year legal campaign 
to defend their small town community from the inherent side effects of traffic, noise, and pol-
lution that accompany superstore operations.  Citizens in Windsor Township, Pennsylvania, 
went to court and scuttled Walmart’s plans to build a 197,000 square foot supercenter that 
did not conform to city zoning regulations.  In Deschutes County, Oregon, residents filed suit 
and defeated Walmart’s attempt to circumvent its local requirement for preconstruction road 
improvements.”); Neita Cecil, Court Rules Against Walmart Permit, DALLES CHRONICLE (Dec. 13, 
2018), http://www.thedalleschronicle.com/news/2018/dec/13/court-rules-against-walmart 
-permit/ (describing successful legal challenge by public group to decision of Oregon Depart-
ment of State Lands to grant wetland fill permit to Walmart; litigation remains ongoing).  
131. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits, N.Y. TIMES (May 
14, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14agency.html (“The federal Miner-
als Management Service gave permission to BP and dozens of other oil companies to drill in 
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EPA has issued over 300 “general permits” permitting companies to discharge 
pollutants but without the safeguards, limitations, and transparency that or-
dinarily accompanies permits issued under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System.132  Permitting, while yielding potential for corporate 
transparency and meaningful public oversight, can also produce cronyism, 
rent-seeking, and corruption.  This makes it a double-edged sword unless 
properly constrained by a statutory framework that allows for robust private 
enforcement and processes that give way only under exigent circumstances 
(for example, when time for a full permit procedure might be impossible due 
to the timeframe).  Nonetheless, we think that the permitting example should 
be part of the equation—a tool, particularly for state and local governments, 
to ensure that the public has a voice and insight into how limited community 
resources are utilized.133  And even in the EPA permitting example, scholars 
have acknowledged that “general permits can fill a useful role in implement-
ing the . . . permit program,” but only when properly calibrated “to provide 
for greater public participation and government oversight.”134
As opposed to a free-for-all scenario, at the very least the presence of a 
permitting scheme allows for flexibility and tinkering in the margins to 
achieve an optimal balance between efficiency and public protection—in 
threats to endangered species—and despite strong warnings from that agency about the im-
pact the drilling was likely to have on the gulf.”). See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: 
NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (2007) (discuss-
ing the administrative process required to obtain a general permit).
132. Gaba, supra note 131, at 410–11.  The consequences of abusive issuance of National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits can be enormous because, as one 
scholar explains,
The [Clean Water Act] contains a provision known as the “permit shield” that protects 
the holder of a valid permit from citizen suits and enforcement actions so long as the 
holder complies with the provisions of its permit . . . The issue in the recent case law 
revolves primarily around what it means to comply with one's permit and whether a 
permit holder may invoke the permit shield defense even without adequately disclosing 
pollutants in the application process. 
Stephanie Rich, Troubled Water: An Examination of the NPDES Permit Shield, 33 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 250, 250 (2016). 
133. Biber & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 138–39, 
[T]he reality is that the permitting system has evolved into a far more flexible, nuanced, 
and innovative institution in the modern administrative state than Epstein’s dismal vi-
sion would suggest is possible.  No doubt agencies abuse the permit power in specific 
cases and there is room for improvement in the permitting system as a whole, but the 
actual experience of permitting as practiced by agencies is rich with evidence that the 
problems motivating Epstein’s pessimistic assessment are neither inevitable nor insur-
mountable.
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much the same way that we argue that FOIA may be the flexible bastion of 
public accountability once it is properly calibrated to focus on the nature of 
information disclosed instead of the creator or holder of information.  As the 
permitting example demonstrates, it is worth thinking of privatization 
broadly to identify other areas of private conduct that warrant public disclo-
sure and scrutiny.  For example, if we conceive of environmental protection 
as a critical governmental activity, we should also regard information on the 
production of industrial emissions as vital public records.
3. Labelling
Labelling can take many forms, and it is certainly not limited to the envi-
ronmental, origin, or nutritional labelling with which the consuming public 
is already very familiar.  Among these familiar labels: “Made in the USA,” 
“Organic,” “No CFCs,” “Please Drink Responsibly,” to list just a few.  But 
consider also some less prominent but equally pervasive labelling schemes: 
“Investments May Lose Value” on investment product advertisements, 
“Please Use Short-Term Lending Responsibly” on payday loan advertise-
ments, and “Prior results do not guarantee future performance” on attorney 
advertisements.  These public disclosures provide the public with important 
information about the products provided by private entities.
Such direct-to-public disclosures need not be limited to information about 
specific products.  For example, though likely a longshot as a practical mat-
ter, a company could be compelled to disclose in television or web advertise-
ments the fact that it has been investigated for human rights and labor viola-
tions at factories abroad.  Such a system could spark a race to the top, 
whereby companies seek to establish a high-quality track record that they 
could then tout to the public.  This is similar to companies touting organic 
or made in America products.
In addition to the obvious political problems in crafting such a system are 
practical problems: what should be mandated and why?  Who would moni-
tor and ensure the accuracy of such disclosures?  As demonstrated by con-
troversies over “organic” or “non-GMO” labelling, which may be abused to 
spotlight products with no measurable health or environmental benefits, 
companies may promote “achievements” that actually provide no material 
benefit to the public.135  Except where clear objective measurements exist, 
these difficulties would need to be carefully navigated to ensure fairness. 
135. See generally Greg Northen, Comment, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive Green 
Marketing in an Increasingly Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 101, 102–03 (2011) 
(describing the rush of food producers to take advantage of health/organic movements via 






      09/18/2019   13:09:53
adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 26 Side B      09/18/2019   13:09:53
C M
Y K
ALR 71.3_AMAN & ROOKARD_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)_ME FORMATTING 8/28/19 6:32 PM
476 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [71:3 
Nonetheless, we maintain that more modest advancements in labelling 
may be readily achievable by requiring corporations to disclose settlements 
with enforcement authorities, perhaps in advertisements and certainly on of-
ficial websites.  Modern governance relies heavily on voluntary corporate 
self-regulation and compliance.  Where abuses of corporate privilege amount 
to social wrongdoing—that is, pure profit-seeking at the expense of public 
health, safety, and the like—the public right to know is undoubtedly trig-
gered.  Labelling is just one way of subjecting violators to meaningful public 
oversight, by not letting such violations occur in obscurity.
As above, a legitimate concern is that too much labelling will make the 
information ineffective.136  Ultimately, this will take a delicate balancing of 
considerations in what to require and where.  But this is a theme throughout 
many critiques of transparency proposals.  Admittedly, there is a great risk 
that private interests, ever deft at elevating profit-driven concerns above all 
else, will overload any transparency mechanism with so much information 
that the sheer volume will bury the most critical details in the morass of data.  
This is not unlike the needle-in-a-haystack approach to responding to civil 
discovery, where the responding party buries meaningful documents in a 
slew of irrelevant or unhelpful files.  But just as technology should enable for 
136. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 749 (2011) (arguing that “mandated disclosure rarely works” such 
that “we need to abandon the idea that people’s autonomy is bolstered by supposedly empow-
ering them to make choices through mandated disclosure”).  Professor Sand suggests that any 
failure is largely due to the “lack of capacity on the side of disclosees to make optimal use of 
the information available.”  Sand, supra note 115, at 213.  Ben-Shahar and Schneider raise 
important concerns that warrant consideration, especially in light of the costs of implementa-
tion of mandated disclosure regimes.  Indeed, all of our proposals in this and the preceding 
Part are subject generally to balancing of costs and benefits, as long as both costs and benefits 
extend far beyond mere pecuniary measurements to include transparency, accountability, dis-
proportionate impact, and other important yardsticks.  But as Sand points out, the issues iden-
tified by Ben-Shahar and Schneider are largely systemic, perhaps remediable by heightened 
education and broader public information efforts (such as by civic groups).  Useless or ineffec-
tive disclosures of course should never be encouraged, and empirical evidence should always 
be evaluated both before and during implementation of such requirement—yet another role 
for which agencies and administrative law procedures are uniquely suited, and another avenue 
for the state to be injected into these otherwise private issues.  A comprehensive response to 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider is beyond the scope of this Article; it is enough for present purposes 
to echo the thoughts of Richard Craswell, who responds that “understanding the different 
possible goals of disclosure is essential to any decision about which disclosures ‘work.’ . . . If 
[Ben-Shahar and Schneider] can one day articulate (and defend) their own criteria for what 
would count as a ‘success,’ they will advance our understanding by even more than they al-
ready have.”  Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Suc-
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greater disclosure, so too will it ultimately allow for better dissemination of 
the most critical details by investigators.  We optimistically suggest that jour-
nalists and activists will catch up to the new normal we propose and will be-
come adept at sorting the needles from the hay. 
B. Privatization of Governmental Enterprises & Land 
Privatization, we have explained, is frequently not accompanied by a con-
tract.137  For example, some privatization advocates have proposed privatiz-
ing USPS or AMTRAK.138  Such examples demonstrate that the approaches 
to transparency described above are not one-size-fits-all.  There may be no 
choice but to deal with such examples in an ad hoc fashion.  But perhaps we 
could construct a principled framework for dealing with such situations.  
Take the USPS example: whatever USPS looks like in private form, the op-
erator should still be required to disclose information to the extent it contin-
ues to provide governmental and monopolistic services.  This means that 
where USPS acts as merely a competitor to FedEx and UPS in the parcel 
industry, the private operators could protect their information as any other 
company may do.  But to the extent these private companies would service 
mail routes, a governmental and monopolistic service, all information relat-
ing to those services must remain publicly available. 
Perhaps one may question what “transparency” could look like in an asset 
sale.  After all, these are conceived as a one-way transaction, a transfer fol-
lowing which the government no longer has an active role.  But the charac-
terization of asset sales as a one-time transfer does not paint a complete pic-
ture.  In a great many areas of privatization, the private owner of the divested 
enterprise remains subject to ongoing governmental regulation, such as 
where a government divests itself of utilities or mass transit.  It is thus not 
entirely accurate to suggest that the government will be hands-off after the 
transaction is complete.
How, then, do we justify imposing any more transparency obligations on 
the private owner of a divested enterprise than those already imposed on 
other private operators in a regulated sector?  The very fact that the govern-
ment—and therefore the public—once owned the asset may make it worthy 
of special treatment upon privatization.  In fact, the government has an ob-
ligation to the public to responsibly manage and, when appropriate, transfer 
or dispose of public assets. 
To this end, we especially emphasize the need for transparency at the pre-
transfer and transfer stages.  Clearly, the public has every right to know the 
137. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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“who, what, when, why, and how” of a transfer of a public good, and public 
access to such fundamental information should not be impeded.  That special 
situation does not apply to privately-founded, but heavily regulated, enter-
prises.
Moreover, assets are frequently publicly held because the public has a spe-
cial interest in the assets.  The fact that an asset is publicly held should be 
prima facie evidence of its public importance.  This should support the im-
position of substantial transparency obligations, even post-sale, to enable the 
public to properly evaluate the transaction and, if warranted, apply pressure 
on the government to rectify any injustice that may be committed by the 
private asset holder.  It is not difficult to articulate some of these special cir-
cumstances justifying transparency expectations when considering just a few 
of the public assets that Trump and others have proposed privatizing.  For 
example, public parks have been publicly held because they may have special 
cultural significance to many different peoples, protection of which would be 
made more difficult by private ownership, or special ecological significance, 
which may be endangered by private ownership.139  Mass transportation has 
traditionally fallen under public purview because of the special competitive 
challenges that the industry would face140 and to ensure nondiscriminatory 
service.141  Air traffic controllers serve a critical public safety function along 
the lines of other uncontroversial public safety providers and face similar 
competitive difficulties.142
The list of unique justifications for public control of certain assets is far 
from complete and far beyond the scope of this Article.  It suffices to say that 
139. See Donald C. Baur, W. Robert Irvin & Darren R. Misenko, Putting “Protection” Into 
Marine Protected Areas, 28 VT. L. REV. 497, 524 (2004) (“[T]he National Park System (Park 
System) has evolved to represent the natural, scenic, cultural, and historic heritage of the 
United States . . . All of the areas in the Park System serve public recreational and educational 
functions.”).
140. Cf. Reasa D. Currier, Public Transit: Looking Back and Moving Forward a Legislative History 
of Public Transportation in the United States and Analysis of Major Issues for the Authorization of the Surface 
Transportation Bill, 37 TRANSP. L.J. 119, 121, 141 (2010) (noting that, in the 1950s, “the majority 
of the nation’s transit systems were privately owned and operated and on the brink of fiscal 
and physical collapse” but since 1964 “[t]he many economic, environmental, and energy con-
servation benefits that public transportation provides have become increasingly more quanti-
fiable and understood both by the general public and by local, state, and federal lawmakers”). 
141. See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Verbit, The Urban Transportation Problem, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 368,
369–88 (1975); Michael Lewyn, “Thou Shalt Not Put a Stumbling Block Before the Blind”: The Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act and Public Transit for the Disabled, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1037–84, 
1100 (2001). 
142. See Ross W. Neher, ATC Privitization: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 83 J. AIR L. &
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we believe this uniqueness justifies unique public rights to transparency.  We 
recognize that at times the fact that a particular asset was privately held may 
simply be an accident of history; this may be accounted for with flexibility 
that provides for robust public participation,  judicial review to assure that 
this flexibility may not be abused, or both.  But again, having this information 
is a minimal prerequisite for democratic participation.  Officials and corpo-
rate interests transferring public assets in backroom deals may never be held 
to account for the unfair results.  Even ex post disclosure frequently will not 
suffice, particularly when the resource divested is a common carrier service 
or public safety provider.  Thus, statutes should mandate ex ante notice and 
opportunities to be heard so that input may be given as to the ownership or 
due process rights that may persist after the good, land, or service is privat-
ized.
IV. THE TRANSPARENCY DEFICIT AND DEMOCRACY
The preceding three parts have made the case that privatization creates a 
transparency deficit.  The way to combat that deficit, we argue, is to inject 
more of the public into the burgeoning private government—specifically via 
transparency mechanisms designed to bring private documents into public 
hands.  We have demonstrated that FOIA, the United States’ primary public 
transparency mechanism, is underinclusive.  It mandates disclosure of some 
documents of immense public importance while permitting other, even more 
important documents, to remain wholly secret—based upon unfounded as-
sumptions about the public character of privately-created or -held docu-
ments.  The fundamental conversation, we maintain, must switch from who 
produces or possesses certain information to how important the information 
is to the public. 
In this final Part, we argue that hidden privatization threatens democratic 
rule and due process, drawing on the lessons learned from the case studies 
outlined above.  Exposing private government is not simply an academic ex-
ercise nor merely a matter of unearthing private wrongdoing.  Rather, we 
argue that private government is an anathema to democracy itself. 
A. A Democracy in Crisis 
Why does it matter whether the public has access to private documents of 
public import?  We have provided some examples of privatized services of 
immense public importance—prisons, education, security, just to name a 
few.  The United States, as well as other democratic countries, are at a cross-
roads with regard to privatization.143  There are ultimately three general 
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paths forward: (1) reject privatization altogether, returning control and re-
sponsibility of public services to the government; (2) embrace privatization, 
reducing the government to an ineffectual shell; or (3) something in between. 
Option one is overly idealistic and impractical.  That does not mean, how-
ever, that we should relinquish the idea of active and fervent public govern-
ance in the name of total privatization, à la option two.  Rather, we maintain 
that a healthy dose of transparency is an important component of option 
three—something in between a rejection of privatization and a complete re-
linquishment of public governance. 
The dominating characteristic of this modern, global era of privatization 
is a stringent sense of cost consciousness.144  Under this modern scheme, gov-
ernments treat economics and finance as concerns equal to personal dignity, 
fundamental fairness, and public well-being.145  As a result, business norms 
and market values have become central to traditionally noneconomic enter-
prises, including education, prison operation, and welfare administration.  
Private companies not only provide these services, but also determine their 
complexion, characteristics, and scope, all pursuant to contracts entered into 
without any direct public input or regular process for seeking such input.  In 
many ways, particularly in the United States, the state has modeled itself after 
the multinational corporation, outsourcing tasks to private companies rather 
than doing them directly.  This does not necessarily mean that the state itself 
is weak or in the process of withering away.  Rather, states frequently make 
these market-oriented regulatory choices in an effort to maximize global 
competitiveness.
“Whereas the rhetoric implies complementarity (more private sector 
equals less government, for example), the diverse complexity of the state’s 
roles in privatization, as well as the variety of businesses and business models 
involved, defy neat boundaries.”146  In the United States, “models and met-
aphors of law are based on a vision of state power that imagines it as a vertical 
hierarchy, the federal government over or above the states; the states over or above
144. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA (1992).
145. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“Government . . . was no longer viewed as an appropriate means of 
solving societal problems . . . ‘Less government’ became the prescribed solution for problems 
ranging from civil rights to the price of natural gas at the wellhead.”); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Snyder Lecture, Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and 
the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 400 (1999) (“One 
can conceptualize these various deregulatory reforms and voluntary regulatory regimes as 
something akin to the delegation of responsibility and policymaking power to the mar-
ket . . . There is an expectation that the impersonal, abstract forces of the market will achieve 
certain policy goals and do so relatively inexpensively.”). 
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local communities; and looking outward from the United States, transna-
tional organizations over national organizations.  The market metaphors are 
primarily lateral, or horizontal”;147 they involve deregulation, no regulation 
or outsourcing of government responsibilities to private providers.  Either 
way, these models are misleading.  Markets are neither self-governing nor 
necessarily democratic.
Delegations to the market, in their many forms, are also not necessarily 
democratic.  In fact, the ongoing marketization of public services threatens 
core democratic values, such as representation, participation, and transpar-
ency.  Markets and democracy are not the same.  Each has fundamentally 
different characteristics and consumers are not, nor should they be, too easily 
equated with citizens.  As Justice Stevens observed in dissenting from the 
Supreme Court’s landmark Citizens United decision:
[T]he distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant.  Although they 
make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of 
it.  They cannot vote or run for office.  Because they may be managed and controlled 
by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests 
of eligible voters.  The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation 
of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.148
These distinctions are manifest wherever citizens act not as “consumers” 
with choices between products, but instead have no option but to turn to the 
government.  Welfare recipients, for example, cannot choose between pro-
viders to provide the basic assistance they require to subsist and to which they 
are entitled pursuant to law.  One effort to privatize the welfare system 
yielded chaos, injured citizens, and broke promises.  In 2007, the State of 
Indiana contracted with IBM for the responsibility of determining welfare 
eligibility.149  But when one unexpected emergency after another followed—
“massive flooding in parts of Indiana in 2007 and the Great Recession of 
2008”150—the result was a massive upswing in welfare claims.151  The inflex-
ibility of the contractual arrangement left the entire welfare system exposed 
and unable to respond to the life-and-death needs of the state’s welfare re-
cipients.152  “As a 2011 Los Angeles Times article stated, ‘documents were 
147. AMAN, supra note 16, at 3. 
148. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (5–4 decision). 
149. For a detailed look at this case study, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization and the 
Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 377 (2013). 
150. Id. at 389. 
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lost, [and when] cases piled up . . . workers started routinely denying appli-
cations just to reduce the backlog.’”153  The private administrators errone-
ously terminated benefits, leaving critically ill and other welfare recipients in 
dire need of support.
State law obligated the Indiana government to fulfill certain responsibili-
ties to the indigent.  But it had contracted these responsibilities out to a pri-
vate entity, unable to fulfill or look beyond its contractual commitments to 
address the needs of the citizens it was hired to serve.  Indiana found itself 
hamstrung—a consequence of its own decision to privatize responsibility for 
its public programs.  And unlike the consumer, the citizen-welfare recipient 
is entitled to due process protections, such as full and timely consideration of 
welfare applications and nonarbitrary termination of welfare benefits.154  In 
the end, IBM failed to protect these due process rights and could not capably 
replace the state as provider of public services. 
The decision to contract out policymaking authority for welfare, schools, 
or prisons, to highlight again just a few common examples, has several im-
plications for democratic governance: 
• First, and most obviously, political decisions made by private contrac-
tors are no longer made by democratically-elected leaders.  Nor are 
they made any longer by administrative bodies instituted by demo-
cratically-elected leaders, whose decisions may be subject to judicial 
review and whom are subject to various forms of indirect accounta-
bility.  As Aman has observed elsewhere, “the resort to privatization 
and outsourcing . . . in such contexts can easily mask the essentially 
political decisions involved.  For example, a decision to outsource pris-
oner healthcare to private providers does not eliminate the fundamen-
tal political decisions involving just how much tax revenue we are will-
ing to spend on these services.”155
• Second, the character of the decision maker has changed.  Gone are 
the public servant decision makers, who are entitled and expected to 
balance a variety of public interest considerations.156  In their stead 
stand for-profit corporations which, by their very nature, prioritize 
153. Id. at 411 (quoting Matea Gold, Melanie Mason & Tom Hamburger, Indiana’s Bumpy 
Road to Privatization, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
jun/24/nation/la-na-indiana-privatize-20110624) (alteration in original).
154. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
155. Aman & Dugan, supra note 2, at 890. 
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profit.  And the course of unsatisfactorily-performing private compa-
nies is not as easily changed as by an annual or biannual election.157
The state must honor its contracts even if the electorate becomes dis-
enchanted with the results or else suffer financially by breaching the 
contracts.158
• Third, public ownership of information—and, in some instances, as-
sets—is replaced by private ownership.  For all of the transparency 
concerns expressed with regard to publicly-owned information, it is 
uncontroversial to suggest that the voting public owns the information 
produced by its government.159  The specific contours of public acces-
sibility to these documents may generate legitimate debate, but the 
background principle to that debate is the expectation that the public 
is entitled to be informed by its government.160  By contrast, any pri-
vate citizen’s ad hoc claim to a private company’s internal document 
would be met, properly perhaps, with a hearty guffaw. 
Transparency is not a silver bullet to address the complex problems 
wrought by privatization.  It is, however, integral to ensuring an informed 
vote and to restore some measure of accountability to the private contractors 
and the public officials who installed the contractors in their positions. 
One alternative to combat these problems is to abolish, or substantially 
scale back, privatization altogether and restore to the state the sole power 
and responsibility for governmental services and operations.  That is, the 
state itself would be required to directly perform tasks ranging from road 
work to publicly-owned stadium and park management. 
But “[p]ublic-private partnerships do not inherently violate legal or nor-
mative principles.”161  In fact, “some of these partnerships may be essential 
157. Professors Eva Hartmann and Poul Kjaer have referred to public welfare states as 
providing “strong shock absorption capacity,” an essential characteristic of which is flexibility 
to respond to public needs. Eva Hartmann & Poul F. Kjaer, The Status of Authority in the Glob-
alizing Economy: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 3 (2018).  
By contrast, private authority can be strikingly inflexible. 
158. The IBM case study discussed above demonstrates these dangers.  Even when the 
state may be correct that a private provider is failing to live up to its contractual promises, the 
taxpayers and recipients of public services bear the brunt of the costs and litigation risks stem-
ming from the mistakes.  See supra notes 149–154 and accompanying text. 
159. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“Copyright protection . . . is not available for any work 
of the United States Government . . . .”). 
160. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (presuming appropriateness of disclosure absent applicable 
exemption).
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for effective 21st-century governance.”162  “Frankly, hazards also inhere in 
the conventional model of public services delivered by public agencies”; even 
publicly-operated prisons frequently suffer from systemic abuses of power, 
for example.163
Even in such situations, however, we have already identified important 
distinctions between dysfunctional private governance (pursuant to a con-
tractual delegation) and dysfunctional public governance: public government 
must account for the array of societal interests, while the private contractor 
prioritizes profit above all else.164  Private opacity is expected and generally 
accepted; public decisions are expected to be made openly, as shown by the 
public pressure that led to FOIA.165  Finally, private actors may be held only 
indirectly accountable through multiple levels of decision makers, and fre-
quently only after messy and expensive litigation.166  Many public servants, 
however, face routine electoral pressures or are controlled by those who face 
regular elections. 
Our proposals herein have aimed to inject a few essential features of public 
governance—primarily in the form of transparency—into the realm of pri-
vate contracting.  In the process, we shift the dominant paradigm from one 
that looks at the type of decision maker (public agency or private contractor) 
to the type of decision made (routine and tangentially related to public well-
being or essential and historically public).  Thus, while we do not believe 
privatization could feasibly be cast aside in its entirety, shedding some light 
upon private government can help compensate for the democracy deficit in-
flicted by passing along critical governmental functions to private actors.  
bility of public-private partnerships can be enhanced by legislative reforms such as those sug-
gested in this article. See discussion and authorities cited supra note 67.  The primary aim of 
our transparency proposals is to bring these areas to light. 
162. Aman & Dugan, supra note 2, at 889. 
163. Id. at 889 n.26 (emphasis removed). 
164. See, e.g., Mintzberg, supra note 89 (“Business has a convenient bottom line, called 
‘profit,’ which can readily be measured.  What is the bottom line for terrorism: The number 
of countries on a list, or of immigrants deported, or of walls built?  How about the number of 
attacks that don’t happen?  Many activities are in the public sector precisely because their in-
tricate results are difficult to measure.”). 
165. See supra Part I.A. 
166. See, e.g., Landyn Wm. Rookard, Comment, Don’t Let the Facts Get in the Way of the 
Truth: Revisiting how Buckhannon and Alyeska Pipeline Messed Up the American Rule, 92 IND. L.J.
1247, 1273–74 & n.220 (2017) (describing barriers facing public interest litigants from Su-
preme Court’s narrow interpretation of “prevailing party” fee shifting statutes); Landyn Wm. 
Rookard, Note, A Referee Without a Whistle: Magistrate Judges and Discovery Sanctions in the Seventh 
Circuit, 91 IND. L.J. 569, 569–70 & nn.5–8 (2016) (citing authorities and describing excessive 
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The ultimate goal is to permit the public to become sufficiently informed and 
to subject the public state, governing through private entities, to heightened 
scrutiny.  Perhaps then, a more serious discourse may emerge as to whether 
these current trends should be slowed or even reversed. 
B. Reexamining the Private-Public Dichotomy 
We have explained that the dominant legal paradigms assume that that 
the terms “private” and “public” may be easily defined—that, at least in the-
ory, the private may be neatly separated from the public.167  This dichotomy, 
it turns out, is far from neat and requires some explication.168  Part of the 
murkiness of these terms is by design.  As attendees of a recent conference on 
privatization observed, private contractors—who by nature advocate for 
greater privatization—have used a wide-ranging variety of terms to describe 
their societal role: 
While the term “privatization” has been used successfully in campaigns to outsource 
government to private corporations, it is beginning to lose its luster.  Corporate interests 
and privatization advocates are developing a new “warm and fuzzy” vocabulary.  They 
are using terms like “public private partnerships,” “pay for success,” and “blended 
financing”.  Government contractors don’t call themselves contractors; they call 
themselves “solutions” and “partners”.169
Terminology then, is important to consider the implication of the labels 
chosen by pro-private and pro-public advocates.
In the United States, the term “privatization” likely evokes the idea of 
“contracting out.”  As explained by Aman, “[p]rivatization in the United 
States usually takes the form of giving over to the market the provision of 
services once provided by government.”170  This form of privatization “reso-
nates with primarily an economic conception of globalization based on mar-
kets and the competition they engender.”171  The focus in such a contract on 
what was spelled out in the contract and, as we have discussed above, not the 
public’s expectations as to the job that needs to be done. 
Internationally, privatization frequently means something different.  In 
many countries, the state is a primary owner of public service providers such 
167. See supra Part I.A. 
168. E.g., Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 366; Verkuil, supra note 10, at 402–21.
169. RESTORING PUBLIC CONTROL OF PUBLIC GOODS CONFERENCE REPORT, GLOBAL
DEV. & ENVTL. INST. AT TUFTS UNIV., 1, 4 (Jan. 2018), http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/ 
Pubs/rp/PublicEconomy/PublicGoodsConferenceReport.pdf. 
170. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Ex-
tend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 513 (2005). 
171. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Mar-
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as utilities or mass transportation.172  In other countries, particularly those 
with a recent history of colonization, the state remains a public owner of crit-
ical land resources.173  Privatization in these situations is frequently charac-
terized by the sale of these public assets, contrasted with the ongoing con-
tractual delegation of authority frequently found in the United States.
But recent developments indicate that the United States may be joining 
the global selling off movement soon.174  They also demonstrate the distinc-
tion between contracting out and asset sales.  For example, Washington 
D.C.’s National Airport and Dulles International Airport are both currently 
owned by the federal government but leased and operated by private par-
ties—a classic example of contracting out.175  The Trump Administration, 
however, has proposed a different tact: selling the airports altogether.176  This 
is part of a larger passel of contemplated sell-offs, which also includes Na-
tional Park Service-operated properties, power transmission facilities, and a 
drinking water source for D.C. and Virginia.177  Such sell-offs still involve 
contracts, of course (that is, contracts to sell), but not the conventional ongo-
ing contractual relationships that characterize the formal delegation of public 
authority and services. 
Our proposals above acknowledge and address privatization in its many 
forms.  We have drawn distinctions between the phenomena of contracting 
out, contracting in, the sale of public assets, and other forms.  We have also 
shown that the public loses effective “control” over something whenever the 
state steps out and private companies step in, be it in owning property or 
other assets, assuming responsibility (such as for providing services), or ac-
quiring public decisionmaking power.
And as Part III demonstrates, much “privatization,” though not conven-
tionally labelled as such, happens without any contract at all.  Regulations 
incorporate by reference privately-promulgated quality and performance 
172. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 370 n.43. 
173. E.g., AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 414–22. 
174. Cf. Sale of the Century, ECONOMIST (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/freeexchange/2014/01/privatisation-state-owned-assets (“Emerging countries have 
led the march on privatisation [by asset sale] in recent years.  The governments of rich coun-
tries with lots of debt have plenty they could also sell . . . .”). 
175. Michael Laris, Trump Administration Wants to Sell National and Dulles Airports, Other Assets, 
Across U.S., WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/traffica 
ndcommuting/trump-administration-wants-to-sell-national-and-dulles-airports-other-assets-
around-us/2018/02/12/3cff381e-100a-11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.html.  
176. Id.  Some of Trump’s divesture proposals involve sales to state or local governments, 
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standards.178  Agencies and statutes delegate regulation and enforcement au-
thority to private professional and trade organizations.179  State and federal 
legislators adopt legislation proposed and drafted by private interest groups.  
Agencies and legislators justify decisions with studies performed and funded 
by private companies.180  The list goes on.
What is really going on here is that the authority of the state is entrusted 
to each of the private entities.  That is, the “monopolistic power of the 
state”181 has been passed, albeit in incremental fashion, to private actors.  
Where a statute or regulation incorporates by reference a privately-created 
standard, the state cedes the authority to the standards organization.  The 
same is true when the state relies upon private certifications. 
In a slightly different manner, when agencies abdicate their statutory and 
ethical responsibilities, the state again shifts its authority to the now-unregu-
lated entities.182  This happens in a very real way: agencies hold the authority 
to act and in fact are required to do so by statute, but by declining to exercise 
it they rely upon corporations and other private entities to fill the void.183
Here, informal mechanisms like corporate responsibility policies and trade 
group responsibility platforms fill the void—and these are unfailingly cali-
178. See discussion supra note 10. 
179. E.g., Andrew Stoltmann & Benjamin P. Edwards, FINRA Governance Review: Public 
Governors Should Protect the Public Interest, 24 PIABA B.J. 369, 369–70 (2017) (“The Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) plays a vital role in regulating the securities indus-
try . . . Although it characterizes itself as ‘independent,’ FINRA’s current governance struc-
ture allows the securities industry to exert substantial control over FINRA’s operations.  Our 
review of FINRA . . . reveal[s] significant conflicts and concerns.”). 
180. See, e.g., In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 314 (2018) (relying 
almost exclusively on industry data and comments in reversing “net neutrality” policy); id. at 
536 (Clyburn, Comm’r, dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s reliance on broadband providers[’] as-
sertions of reductions in investment is highly-flawed [sic].”). 
181. Anthony D’Amato, The Path of International Law, 1 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1995). 
182. E.g., In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 533 (Clyburn, Comm’r, 
dissenting) (“[I am outraged] because the FCC pulls its own teeth, abdicating responsibility to 
protect the nation’s broadband consumers . . . . [A] soon-to-be-toothless FCC[] is handing the 
keys to the internet . . . over to a handful of multi-billion-dollar corporations.”). 
183. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text.  Professor Kuttner raises the poign-
ant example of deregulation—at the behest of a profitable but restrained banking industry—
after a period of prosperous “managed capitalism” immediately following World War II.  
KUTTNER, supra note 1, at 71.  This opened the floodgates to a thirty-year “race to the bottom” 
in which the United States and Europe ceded their rights as sovereign nations to make deci-
sions on labor standards, currency standards, and trade policy, among others, to nominally 
transnational organizations and treaties, which had been entirely captured by corporate in-
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brated to ward off public scrutiny and proper regulations by paying lip ser-
vice to upholding the greater good.184  Decisions which are supposed to be 
dedicated to elected officials and appointed bureaucrats are instead made 
behind closed doors in swanky boardrooms.  As Professor Robert Kuttner 
has explored in detail, international commitments to deregulation “represent 
lost sovereignty—nominally to a transnational institution, but effectively to 
‘the market’—as personified by the invisible hands of large banks and multi-
national corporations.”185  Professor Kuttner characterizes the United States 
in particular as welcoming the opportunity to cede its “sovereignty when the 
effect is to liberate finance and commerce from binding national rules.”186
In addition to the fact that “[World Trade Organization (WTO)] procedures 
are far less transparent or observant of due process than are the procedures 
of national democracy,”187 the very nature, existence, and persistence of such 
arrangements are obscured if not completely hidden from public view.  The 
public is not even aware that essential governmental decisions—like currency 
controls, labor standards, and trade policies—have been delegated to inter-
national organizations captured by corporate interests espousing an extreme 
form of neoliberalism.  This particular brand of privatization lurks beneath 
the surface and poses immense challenges for transparency and democracy.
The literature exploring how contracting out human services effects a shift 
in authority is already robust.  We have only built upon that corpus here.  
But as Professor Claire Cutler has lamented in a slightly different context, 
“[O]ne of the major deficiencies in mainstream approaches to transnational 
legal scholarship is the failure to acknowledge the rise of private power and 
authority in the international political economy.”188  Much less has been writ-
ten about the authority implications of other forms of privatization.189
We have identified transparency deficits brought about by the forms of 
privatization discussed above and sketched proposals to address these defi-
cits.  Through this unique pragmatic vehicle—our case studies are meant to 
provide practical transparency-enhancing solutions—we have proposed an 
expanded FOIA as a firewall against the effects of unchecked privatization 
that threaten the democratic underpinnings of public authority. 
184. See AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 282–325.
185. KUTTNER, supra note 1, at 197. 
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. A. Claire Cutler, The Judicialization of Private Transnational Power and Authority, 25 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61, 67 (2018). 
189. But see, e.g., AMAN & GREENHOUSE, supra note 10, at 414–23; SASKIA SASSEN,
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CONCLUSION
Government contracting exists as a way to reduce costs—and this includes 
the cost of complying with transparency requirements.  To the extent ex-
tending basic public protections prices the private sector out of providing a 
particular service (e.g., prisons), that may be a fair indication that the public 
sector should provide the service.  In other words, while the modern reality 
of public-private partnerships will only expand and require compromise, it 
has and should have limits.  The mere fact that governmental activities and 
responsibilities of all kinds and at all levels—global, national, state, and lo-
cal—have been entrusted to private providers does not mean that the public 
has relinquished its right to depend upon the government to ensure quality 
services, democratic decisionmaking, and due process.  Such public rights 
are inherent to a democracy.  If the cost of transparency raises the cost of 
privatization beyond the cost at which the public sector may provide a ser-
vice, then the public would best be served by public providers.  
Just as a company should not be able to avoid discovery requirements by 
outsourcing, so too an agency should be prohibited from avoiding providing 
public information merely because it was created by or rests in the hands of 
private parties.  Congress could mandate that agencies take transparency 
into consideration when contracting just like it requires agencies to take other 
cost-benefit analyses into account.  Any restrictions on public access should 
properly be counted as a “cost,” particularly where a document would be 
open to public access had the contracting agency created it.  Requiring an 
agency to justify not including a transparency provision would be consistent 
with the purposes underlying FOIA and the need for flexibility and discretion 
in contracting. 
The anti-institutional bias which emerged in the late 1970s has resulted in 
a full-throated transfer of sovereignty—the authority to make decisions 
which impact and bind the general public—to private companies and do-
mestic and transnational authorities captured by those private entities.  The 
roles of citizen and consumer have crossed.  The public is in desperate need 
of information to assess the actions of both the private and public state, and 
to respond rationally.  The legitimacy of modern democracy demands noth-
ing less. 
